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THE UNBORN PLAINTIFF
David A. Gordon•
is almost twenty-five years since Professor Winfield's article
"The Unborn Child" was published. 1 The development of this
area of the law during the past quarter century is probably summed
up in the distinction between that title and the one to this article.
The defective or abnormal infant constitutes an increasingly
pressing problem; the cost to society and in human happiness is
beyond measurement.2 Legal attempts at a solution have been, as
may be expected, only partial. They are reflected in the distinct
eugenic policy that is embraced in those statutes or by those principles of law that forbid marriage within the defined limit of
consanguinity.8 Again, both physically and mentally diseased persons are occasionally denied the capacity to marry, sometimes unjustifiably.~

I

T

• Advocate, Supreme Court of South Africa.-Ed.
1. 4 U. TOR.ONTO L.J. 278 (1942). That article was also published in 8 CAMB. L.J.
76 (1942).
2. It has been estimated that 250 thousand infants suffering from significant birth
defects are born each year in the United States. MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 6

(1962).
3. See generally FoOTE & SANDER, CASES ON FAMILY LAw 2C-16 (temp. ed. 1962).
Genetically speaking, the prohibition of marriage on the grounds of affinity are unjustifiable, and even some consanguinous prohibitions are subject to criticism. Moore,
A Defense of First Cousin Marriages, 10 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REv. 136 (1961). See also Hefer,
'N Aantekening oor enkele aspekte van die verbod op huwelike tussen persons wat
binne bespaalde grade aan mekaar verwant is, 21 TYD. HED. H-R REG. 22 (1958); Note,
17 IowA L. REv. 87 (1931). For the Roman Law attitude, which consisted of a denial
of the appellation "children,'' see CoDE THEOD. 3.12.1-2.
4. See FOOTE & SANDER, op. dt. supra note 3, at 2C-59. The prohibition against the
marriage of epileptics has been criticized on the ground that the genetic factor in
epilepsy is insignificant. At least three states (Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin)
have repealed the statutes setting out the restrictions.
See generally BARROW & FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW (1956), WILY & STALLWORTHY,
MENTAL ABNOR.MALITY AND THE LAw 163 (1962). Over half the states of the United
States have eugenic sterilization laws that present a combined classification of epileptics,
hereditary criminals, mental deficients, sex offenders, and syphilitics.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Supreme Court struck down under
the equal protection clause the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act [OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 171 (1935)). In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), Mr. Justice Holmes
upheld an order directing the sterilization of a feeble-minded inmate of an institution
in Virginia, stating: "It is better for all the world if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes
•••• Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. See CURRAN, LAW AND
MEDICINE 802-09 (1960); FOOTE & SANDER, op. dt. supra note 3, at 2C-72-80; Cook,
Eugenics or Euthenics, 37 ILL. L. REv. 287 (1943).
Restrictions upon persons suffering from venereal diseases are common. FooTE &:
SANDER, supra, at 2C-80 (see also note 212 infra). Some states forbid marriage between
persons suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis in its advanced stages. E.g., WASH. REv.
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Winfield's study was primarily comparative, and, since 1942, a
number of legal systems have considered the question of "uterine
personality" in tort law. Motivated by a common concern and
backed by the tremendous increase in medical knowledge, almost
all of the systems which have considered the problem have afforded
at least some relief to a child for injuries sustained by it while in
utero matris.
The legal analyses adopted in order to reach this result differ
widely, however. In addition, the impact of medical advances upon
this branch of the law has been so influential that one is compelled
to consider the present state of modern scientific knowledge in
order to outline the present boundaries of the law.
Doctors and lawyers have eloquently pleaded for clarification
of the limits of therapeutic abortion; and one of the favorite
arguments invoked in justification of the therapeutic termination
of pregnancies is that which points to the devastating consequences
on the fetus of German measles and irradiation.11 The choice
between whether we ought to solve a problem by bluntly removing
it or instead perpetuate human suffering is beyond the scope of my
inquiry. Suffice it to say that there is a great deal of merit in the arguments presented on both sides of this controversial question. But
· one thing .is certainly clear: there is a powerfully articulate body
of lawyers who feel that, with the present knowledge of the probabilities of serious deformity or abnormality, it is unnecessary to allow
production of such infants to materialize.6 Thus it seems strange that
CODE § 26.04.030 (1961). Cases of congenital tuberculosis have been reported iri
TAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 308-09 (~962).

MON·

5. FooTE &: SANDER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5B-11-29; G. L. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY
OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1957); Final Report, Los Angeles County Grand Jury
53 (1960); Culiner, Some Medical Aspects of Abortion, IO So. AFRICAN J. FoR. MED, 9
(1963); Leavy &: Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws,
35 So. CAL. L. REv. 123 (1962); Packer &: Gambell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in
Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1959).
For religious viewpoints on this and related matters, see DALY, MORALS, LAw
AND LIFE (1961); Curran, in ROSEN, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 153-72 (1954).
6. In addition to authorities cited in note 5 supra, the American Law Institute has
reported that:
"Current American legislation does not provide for aborting probable defective
offspring, except as such result might be reached under the half dozen statutes
that prohibit 'unlawful' abortion without defining what is unlawful. Despite the
uncertain legal status of eugenic as distinguished from therapeutic abortion, such
operations are regularly performed by responsible physicians in hospitals throughout the country••••
"The criminal law should speak unambiguously on the authority of the physician to act where he believes that continuance of the pregnancy entails substantial
risk that the offspring will be a physical or mental casualty. The prospective birth
of a seriously defective child may even constitute a threat to the mental health
of the apprehensive mother, but it seems preferable to rest the matter directly on
scientific prognostication of the child's state of health rather than on the more
uncertain prediction of the mother's reaction."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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legal systems have experienced difficulty in recognizing a right to
compensatory relief for infants who were subjected to unnecessary
tortious infliction of harm during prenatal life.
To Religion and Medicine, life begins at conception; 7 but, to
Law, legal personality begins only at birth. 8 This jurisprudential
concept is the origin of much of the difficulty.

I.

HISTORY

A. The Common-Law Foundations
The early common-law commentators dealt with abortion and
the situation in which an assault resulted in a miscarriage in the
same terms. Thus in Coke's Third Institute the following appears:
"If a woman be quick with child and by a potion or otherwise
killeth it in her womb, or if a man beat her, whereby the child
dieth in her body and she is delivered of a dead child, this is a
great misprision, and no murder, but if the child be born
alive and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is
murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in
rerum natura when it is born alive." 9
Blackstone was more effusive, declaring that:
"Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature
in every individual: and it begins in contemplation of law as
soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a
woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise
killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her whereby the
child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child;
this though not murder was by the ancient law homicide or
manslaughter. . . . An infant in [sic] ventre sa mere, or in
the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many
purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a
copyhold estate made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to
it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and
to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually
born. And in this point the Civil law agrees with ours."10
At this early and formative stage of the common law, the child
in utero was therefore not an object of ownership, but rather was
7. "For many years while doctors scoffed the Church maintained that an embryo
had life from the very beginning and that to destroy it was to take life. This contradicted the generally accepted opinion that life did not begin until around the
time the mother felt the baby's movements. Scientists now believe as the Church
has contended, that there is life from the moment of conception."
Sontheimer, Abortion in America Today, Woman's Home Companion, Oct. 1955, p. 44,
in FOOTE &: SANDER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5B-21.
8. See text at note 46 infra.
9. 3 CoKE, THIRD INST, 50 (1797).
10. 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTAltIES Comm. 1, 129-ll0 (4th ed. 1771).
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the subject of state protection. It was also recognized as capable of
acquiring property rights, but this was conditioned by live birth.
As The Earl of Bedford's case held: "[A]lthough filius in utero
matris est pars viscerum matris . . . yet the law in many cases hath
consideration of him in respect of the apparent expectation of his
birth." 11
It is interesting to speculate, as the Louisiana court did in construing its civil code, 12 as to whether the recognition extended to
the child in criminal and property law was exclusive. Perhaps there
was a general recognition of a uterine personality and the illustrations were made simply because they were relevant to questions
that would immediately come to mind. But, whatever might have
been the intention, decisions recognizing the unborn child as a
being in law were limited to these two fields. 13
In addition, the child was regarded as having a claim to life as
evidenced by the rule requiring the staying of the execution of a
pregnant woman until after its birth. 14
It was upon these foundations that the American contribution
to this branch of the law was laid. Though the path was a tortuous
one, thorough debate and frank discussion, combined with a warm
reception afforded to advances in science, have provided a fine
example of the inherent creative aspect of the common law. 15
B. The Initial American View

Despite the resulting disappointment, it was perhaps fitting
that it fell upon Mr. Justice Holmes, while still on the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, to first consider, in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, the status of the fetus in common-law tort law. 16
The Holmes opinion bristled with dicta and an inexplicable er11. Michaelmas Term, 28 &: 29 Eliz., 4 Coke 7 f.7 (1586) (Wilson ed. 1777), 77 Eng.
Rep. 421. Coke's citations, omitted here, are discussed in Winfield, supra note 1, at 280.
12. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1928). See also Pinchin N.O. v.
Santam Ins. Co., [1963] 2 So. Afr. L.R. 254 (W).
13. R. v. Senior, 1 Moody C. C. 346 (1932); Villar v. Gilbey, [1907] A.C. 139; Elliott
v. Joicey, [1935] A.C. 209. See also Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Vesey Jr. 227 (1798), 31
Eng. Rep. 117 (1798), where Judge Buller's "let us see what this non-entity can do"
speech is set out at pp. 321 and 163.
14. 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2.51.9 (Curwood ed. 1824); 2 HALE, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 412 (Dogherty ed. 1800), reports that a jury of twelve "discreet" women
were empanelled to decide whether to delay execution. Hale goes on to say, "but I
have rarely found but the compassion of their sex is gentle to them in their verdict,
if there be any colour to support a sparing verdict." Id. at 413.
15. See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV, L. REv. 463,
484-85 (1962): "Seldom in the law has there been such an overwhelming trend in such
a relatively short period of time as there has been in the trend towards allowing re•
covery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant." Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 62
(N.D. Iowa 1960) (div. action applying Iowa law).
16. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 188 Mus. 14 (1884).
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ror.17 Perhaps a good deal of the hardship flowing from it might
have been avoided if subsequent courts had at least limited it to
its holding. Holmes held:
"[I]f we should assume . . . that a man might owe a civil
duty and incur a conditional prospective liability in tort to
one not yet in being, and if we should assume also that causing
an infant to be born prematurely stands on the same footing
as wounding or poisoning, we should then be confronted by
the question . . . whether an infant dying before it was able
to live separated from its mother could be said to have become
a person recognized by the law as capable of having a locus
standi in court, or of being represented there by an administrator."18
In the light of the result, as Holmes nowhere specifically answered
the question he posed, his answer must be assumed to have been no,
the infant not yet viable does not have legal personality.19 Holmes'
fiat is the extent of the authority of the case.

C. Debate and Progress
Subsequent courts, however, did not reopen the question for
some sixty years; fortified by other broad considerations and
reasoning, they denied the remedy. But this did not occur without
difference of opinion.
In Stemmer v. Kline, Chief Justice Brogan (dissenting) joined
issue with the basis of the Holmes opinion. He asked why the
courts should feel restrained from breaking with the doctrine
that a child en ventre sa mere has no separate being in the field
of torts when in every other field of law a child has a separate
being, is a person, if being in that category is for its benefit.20
17. Holmes argued that the analogy from the criminal statutes to tort law in fact
hindered recovery on the grounds that the accused's act would be murder (homicide)
only if the mother were "quick" with child. Holmes then noted the statutory provisions for the punishment of attempts to procure miscarriages and, noting the increase
in punishment if the woman died after the attempt, seized upon the fact that there
was no corresponding increase if the child died even after leaving the womb. The
New York Law Revision Commission, Communication to the Legislature Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, Jan. 23, 1935, at 6 n.4, points out the fallacy of this argument.
"The argument of the court based on the last mentioned statute failed to take
into consideration the fact that the first statute amply provides for punishment for
the death of the child, and it would be unnecessary repetition to include the
provisions of the first statute in the second. It is submitted that the court has
neglected to perform the simple act of reading the two statutes together and has
thereby drawn unfounded conclusions from the language of the last statute alone."
18. 138 Mass. at 16. Holmes went on ,to add: "(A]s the unborn child' was a part of
the mother at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be
recovered for at all was recoverable by her.•••" Id. at 17.
19. This is discussed in detail in the text accompanying note 52 infra.
20. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L 455, 468, 26 A.2d 684, 687 (1942) (concurring
opinion).
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The argument that the right of action should be denied for
reasons of practical convenience and public policy21 was met by a
more persuasive policy justification in the same year. The Supreme
Court of Canada, in a decision that exerted a considerable influence on subsequent legal development in the United States, got
to the root of the matter in stating that, since the child must carry
the burden of infirmity that results from the other's fault, it is
only natural justice that it, if born alive and viable, be allowed
to maintain an action.22
Again, a broad justification for denial of relief was sought by
the submission that in many cases it would be impossible to establish satisfactorily, except by speculation, the viability of the
child and that its death or condition was proximately caused by
the injury.23 This was answered with the observation that the right to
bring an action is clearly distinguishable from the ability to prove
the facts. The first cannot be denied simply because the second may
not exist.24
The limits of judicial creativity were then summoned by an
Illinois court in an effort to make the injustice more palatable.
It responded to the argument that where there is a wrong a remedy
should be provided by saying this plea should be addressed to
the legislature.25 But the challenge was met squarely by the Ohio
court: "No legislative action is required to authorize recovery for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of another. Such right
was one existing at common law.'' 26
A Texas court was probably the most candid, expressing the
basic fear that many false claims, difficult to refute, would follow
if such a right of action were recognized.27 The Maryland court
retorted, however, that since the detection and elimination of faked
claims is not new to judicial bodies, ·that argument should not
prevent legitimate claims from being heard.28
Those courts that denied relief also appealed to the lack of
precedent for such a right of action, argued that the fiction of the
21. Krantz v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio N.P. 445, 452 (1933).
22. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, 344 (1933). The court in Bonbrest
v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946), tersely answered the "stability argument":
"The law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science has made
progress since 1884."
23. Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944,
950 (1935).
24. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 437, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951).
25. Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 108, 19 N.E.2d 446, 450 (1939).
26. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 128, 87 N.E.2d ll34, 340
(1949).
27. Magnolia Coca-Cola Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. ll47, ll60 (19ll5).
28. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 4ll7, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951), adding
that medical knowledge would do away with some of that difficulty.
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civil law as to property rights and the criminal law were not of
general application,29 and relied on the Restatement of Torts. 30
Two courts expressed the fear that from recognition of a right of
action would follow the capacity of the child to sue its mother, a
question they were not asked to decide. 31
The courts that finally did grant the remedy did little more, as
has been seen, than to controvert persuasively the opposition arguments. Some invoked the ubi jus, ibi remedium maxim.82
It can be appreciated that the argument grounded upon lack
of authority soon itself provided enough authority to allow courts to
rely on stare decisis, and Dietrich fathered an impressive line of
precedent.83 After 1946, however, when a district court in Bonbrest
v. Kotz 84 relied upon the dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital to
sustain the plaintiff's action,35 a growing body of conflicting decisions developed, finally culminating in a number of courts overruling their previous decisions. 36
In addition, other courts, considering the question de novo,
have granted the child's right of action.37 Today the majority rule
permits some recovery, although, as discussed later, it may be limited
and conditioned. Besides the four jurisdictions that have not had the
opportunity to reconsider their pre-Bonbrest views, 38 the question
must be regarded as still doubtful in three other states, primarily because of the broad reasoning adopted in opinions denying a right of
action to the beneficiaries of an infant that died en ventre sa mere. 39
Most of the cases have been heard on demurrers or motions
29. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); cf. Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951).
30, RE.s'l'ATEMENT, TORTS § 869 (1934).
31. Stanford v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
32. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. E.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A.2d 497 (1960).
33. E.g., Turknett v. Keaton, 266 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1956) (diversity suit applying
Texas law); Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952);
Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Jacketti v. Pottstown Rapid
Transit Co., 67 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 37 (Pa. County Ct. 1950).
!14. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
35. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
36. E.g., Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955);
Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224,
258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Puhl v.
Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
37. E.g., Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Poliquin v. MacDonald,
101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 537, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960);
Seattle First Nat'! Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
38. These are Rhode Island, Alabama, Texas, and Michigan. La Blue v. Speck.er,
358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960), is a clear indication that the next time the
question is posed Michigan will join the majority.
39. Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155
Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953).
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for summary judgment,40 and after settlement of the particular
legal controversy they have disappeared from the reports. To the
writer's knowledge, at least one of these cases went to subsequent
trial where the infant plaintiff lost on the issue of causation.41 Perhaps it is valid to assume that others were not continued because
of the same difficulty.
A good example of the judgments handed down by the courts
is provided by Tursi v. New England Windsor Company: 42 "Where
a viable fetus is injured en ventre sa mere through the negligence of
the defendants he has, when born, a cause of action against them." 43
From this it appears that two conditions are required: viability
and birth. Present controversy surrounds these requirements.
Apparently only one state has considered the advisability of
legislative action. In 1917, the Missouri Children's Code Commission proposed the adoption of the following provision:

"Recovery for prenatal injuries:
"Any person who has sustained a prenatal injury shall be
entitled to recover therefor as though he had been born at the
time of sustaining such injury. This Act shall apply whether
such person was born in or out of lawful wedlock."44
This proposal, however, was not adopted by the Missouri legislature.
II.

MODERN CONTROVERSY: WHEN DOES PROTECTION START AND

Is IT

CONDITIONAL?

Shortly after conception the zygote (fertilized ovum) goes
through a period of cleavage (cell division), and finally a cluster
of cells called the morula is formed. At about the sixth day, the
morula divides into an inner and an outer layer of cells, and the
40. The opinions delivered on appeal from trial judgments are discusred at note
267 infra.
41. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956). In
this case, early in the mother's pregnancy she had been injured in a motor car collision.
The infant plaintiff was born with a deformed foot, ankle, and leg. At the trial, two
of America's leading authorities in the field of prenatal injuries, Professor T. Inghalls
and Professor A. L. Hertig, gave expert evidence for the respective sides. Professor
Hertig for the defense testified that at the time of the injury the limb buds of the
infant had not yet formed, but that in any event it was inconceivable that only the
right leg would be affected, regard being had to the developmental arrest theory
which, at the time when the accident took place, would have rendered both limb buds,
if in existence, vulnerable. See text accompanying note 159 infra. The jury accepted
the defense contentions.
42. 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955).
43. Id. at 248. (Emphasis added.)
44. HousE JOURNAL 571 (1919). The New York Law Revision Commission did not
advocate any legislative action in its report. See note 17 supra.
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inner cells then subdivide into a tri-partite cellular structure.45
These compartments contain the fundamental materials necessary
for the growth and development of the different parts of the human
body. This organism, since it possesses the potentiality to develop
into a human being, is probably entitled by force of nature to claim
a potential "natural personality"; but it is only a fact in nature and
is independent of the law, since "legal personality" is the grant of
the law. 46
In most legal systems, legal personality begins at live birth,47
but when it is to the benefit of the infant in utero, as sometimes
happens in property law, rights have been held to vest in it immediately provided it is subsequently born alive.48 In tort law as well,
the child dependent who was in utero at the time of its father's death
has later been given a statutory right of action against the wrongdoer;49 but such an action may not be maintained for its benefit
while it is still in utero. 50 The mechanics of recognition has been
the granting of conditional legal personality by means of the fiction
of birth to the infant yet unborn. Although American courts have
occasionally referred to the property law fiction, 51 they have not used
45. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 69-70 (6th ed. 1954); MONTAGU, PRENATAL
INFLUENCES 20·23 (1962).
46. NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY 24 (1938). Graveson
describes "natural personality" as follows: "This natural personality is not concerned
with legal capacities or prohibitions, so that a person may count the science of burglary
or the art of forgery among his natural accomplishments simply because these are
things which he can do. Again, one or more of his five senses may be deficient or overdeveloped. They are part of his natural personality." GRAVESON, STATUS IN THE COMMON
LAW Ill (1953). See generally C. K. ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIES 28-70 (1931); DIAS &: HUGHES,
JURISPRUDENCE 283 (1957).
It seems necessary to have the additional requirement of a potentiality to develop
into a human being, for, if we understand all living things to be cellular and grant
natural personality to them, then spermatozoa that are also cellular must also be living.
If "natural personality" demands "legal personality," as the American courts have held
(sec text at note 66 infra), then the dropping of a test tube of spermatozoa may well
give rise to a cause of action. HART &: SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 495 (temp. ed. 1958).
47. See authorities cited supra note 46.
48. Tomlin v. Laws, 301 Ill. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922); In re Holthausen's Will, 175
Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Elliott v. Jokey, [1935] A.C. 209; Villar
v. Gilbey, [1907] A.C. 139; Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts, 15 RUTGERS L. REv.
61, 66 n.24 (1960); Winfield, The Unborn Child, U. TORONTO L.J. 278, 279 (1942).
49. Phair v. Dumond, 99 Neb. 310, 156 N.W. 637 (1916); Quinlen v. Welch, 23
N.Y.S. 963 (1893); Herndon v. St. Louis Ry., 37 Okla. 256, 128 P. 727 (1912); Nelson v.
Galveston Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S.W. 1021 (1890).
50. The George and the Richard, L.R. 3 Adm.&: Eccl. 466, 24 L.T. 717, 20 W.R. 246
(1871); Manns v. Carlon, [1940] Viet. L.R. 280. Cf. Delatte v. United States Fid. &: Guar.
Co., ll6 So. 2d 169 (La. 1959); Barry, The Child en Ventre Sa Mere, 14 AuST. L.J. 351,
356 (1941).
51. E.g., Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) (which refused to extend
the property law fiction to tort); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. &: C. 227, 228 (Dist. Ct.
1924). See also Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235 (1958). Compare Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Ry., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913), with Steggall v. Morris, 363
Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
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it as the basis for granting tort remedy, and they have removed the
distinction between "natural" and "legal" personality. It remains to
be seen why this has happened.
It will be recalled that Justice Holmes stated:
"[I]f we should assume . . . that a man might owe a civil
duty and incur a conditional prospective liability in tort to one
not yet in being . . . we should then be confronted by the
question . . . whether an infant dying before it was able to
live separated from its mother could be said to [be] ... a person
recognized by the law as capable of having a locus standi in
court...." 52
The words "conditional prospective liability" and the reference
to the capacity to sue in court seem to be relevant to birth and
legal personality. Apparently, Holmes was not considering the
question of biological separability.53 In Dietrich, however, the premature infant was found to have lived for some ten to fifteen
minutes. 54 Thus, if the learned Justice denied relief on the basis
of a lack of legal personality, he recast the definition of that concept and adopted the untenable proposition that legal capacity is
conditioned by an ability to survive. A man suffering from advanced
cancer probably has not the ability to survive; yet, if he is injured
before he dies, it would be absurd to deny him relief in a court
of law merely because he has no capacity to survive.55
A. The Major Approaches
1. The Biological Approach

Judge Boggs, in his influential dissent in Allaire,56 flatly refused
to contradict Holmes and was driven to interpret Dietrich as
holding that a duty of care could not be owed to the fetus since
it was not an entity that could independently come within the risk
of the harm created by the defendant or one that ought to have
been foreseen by him. 57 Judge Boggs then sought an independent
plaintiff without considering further whether or not as a matter of
law that plaintiff should enjoy legal personality and, if so, how it
could be best achieved. Seizing upon the concept of viability-that
52. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884). (Emphasis
added.)
53. See CURRAN, I.Aw AND MEDICINE 117 (1960), wherein the whole dispute is summed
up as one relating to "legal status."
54. There is some dispute as to whether the child lived at all. Stewart, The Case of
the Prenatal Injury, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 527, 530 (1963), doubts whether it survived
birth.
55. The quantum of damages recoverable would be reduced, but this is irrelevant
to the ability to bring suit.
56. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 III. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
57. This question is dealt with in detail in the text accompanying note 113 infra.
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period of intrauterine development when an infant is able to live
outside its mother's womb 58-he declared separate existence to commence from that point. Having found his entity, he automatically
extended to it the beginning of legal personality.
Therefore, from the start the common law precluded itself from
adopting the civil law fiction of "birth for benefit." In correcting
the scientific errors of both Holmes and Boggs, American courts
have fused legal personality with biological existence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had in fact adopted Boggs' dissent, but it
denied the right to recovery on the ground that the infant was
not yet viable at the time it was injured, despite the fact that it
was subsequently born alive. 59 Bonbrest v. Kotz60 was limited to
the viable infant. Other courts followed suit.
With the increase in medical knowledge, the erroneous belief
that "viability" constituted the origin of separate being fell increas-_
ingly under fire. Medicine emphasized that the crucial period of
intrauterine development during which the fetus would be most susceptible to environmental influences was during the first trimester,
long before viability.61 Again, increased medical knowledge as to the
effects of irradiation,62 the etiology of certain infectious diseases, 63
and the importance of nutritional factors 64 indicate that healthy
fetal dev~lopment may depend upon factors existing at the time
of, or even prior to, conception. A viability limitation, therefore,
presents a potential of working injustice.
The courts might have argued that, as birth and viability
are in a sense analogous facts vis-a-vis existence. in the external
world, there would be no need to underpin a fiction of birth by
a true fact, since fictions in law are understood to be untrue. Thus
viability could have been discarded as unnecessary,65 the fiction
adopted, and protection extended to the infant from the time of
conception.
American courts, however, have persisted in a biological approach.66 Finding "life" in medicine begins at conception, eight
58. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1737 (4th ed. 1951).
59. Lipps v. Milwaukee Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
60. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
61. See text at note 164 infra.
62. See text at note 233 infra.
63. See text at note 205 infra.
64. See text at note 148 infra.
65. The days of Benthamite "raving" at fictions fortunately are past, and it is conceded by many that they play an important and integral part in every legal system.
See generally FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 338-50 (Anchor ed. 1963); Fuller,
Legal Fictions (pts. 1-3), 25 ILL. L. REv. 363, 513, 865 (1930-31); Van der Merwe, 26
TYD. Vlll HED. R-H REG. 291, 294 (1963).
66. The height of this approach was reached in Kelley v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542,
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states have accorded legal personality to the zygote. 67 There is no
doubt but that this end result is proper and just, and it may
be confidently asserted that in the future the courts will lift the
bar of viability. The closer one gets to the estimated time of conception, 68 the more onerous will the plaintiff's burden of proof
become. But this should not go to the right of action.
The only doubt that can be raised concerns the sequelae of the
biological process of reasoning, for biology inevitably came into
conflict with legal principles and policy foundations when the
question of the availability of a wrongful death action on behalf
of the beneficiaries of a stillborn infant was presented to the courts.
Wrongful death actions are, strictly speaking, separate causes of
action not dependent upon the rights of the decedent. 60 But the
courts have not interpreted them in this manner. Absent specific
indications to the contrary, the action is considered to be derivative. 70
2. The Causative Approach
In addition to the biological approach outlined above and the
civil-law approach, which regards the infant en ventre sa mere as
born whenever birth would be to its advantage, 71 there ~ an approach
125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953), where it was held: "We ought to be safe in this respect by
saying that legal separability should begin where there is biological separability." Id. at
543-44. See also Bennet v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 109 (1958).
Errors of biology have been perpetrated, however, as in Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942), where the dissent stated: "While it is a fact that there
is a close dependence by the unborn child on the organism of the mother, it is not
disputed today that the mother and the child are two separate and distinct entities;
that the unborn child has its own system of circulation of the blood separate and
apart from the mother; that there is no communication between the two circulation
systems." 128 N.J.L. at 466, 26 A.2d at 686.
It is only after approximately twenty-five days that the fetal heart begins to circulate blood. The interchange of blood between the child and the mother is, to say
the least, absolutely essential. See MoNTAGU, op. cit. supra note 45, at 36, 47.
67. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956);
Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App.
2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Bennet v. Hymers, supra note 66; Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelley v. Gregory, supra note 66; Sinkler v. Kneale, 401
Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Von Elbe v. Stugebaker-Packard Corp., 15 Pa. D. &: C. 2d
629 (1958). In addition, there is a dictum in Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis.
2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), that suggests that from the time of conception Wisconsin will protect the infant.
68. The necessity for estimation lies in the fact that the female ovum is susceptible
to implantation for only about four or five days during each twenty-eight day cycle,
and spermatozoa may survive anywhere from two to 110 hours. GLAISTER, MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY 359 (11th ed. 1962).
69. PROSSER, ToRTS § 105 (2d ed. 1955); Harris, Damages in Prenatal Injuries Cases
12 (unpublished manuscript 1962).
70. 2 HARPER&: JAMES, TORTS§ 24.4 (1956); Note, 110 u. PA. L. REv. 553,557 (1962).
71. See generally 1 PLANI0L, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DRorr CIVIL § 366 (La. Law Inst.
Transl. 1959); CIVIL CODE (JAPAN) l; B.G.B. I. This is also the approach of the common
law relating to property rights.
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that avoids a consideration of the legal status of the fetus and requires only that a causal link between plaintiff's condition and the
defendant's wrongful act be established. 72 The dissection of the
problem under this approach is purely causative and ignores the
question of when the harm was caused to the child. But implicit
in this view is a requirement that the plaintiff subsequently enjoy
legal personality-that is, birth is the donor of the right. Not only
is the general law of status left untouched, but there is no necessity
to debate the validity of recognizing the child in utero through
analogies drawn from other branches of the law. Under all three
approaches, protection is or should be afforded from conception;
but, if the infant dies in utero or is stillborn, the approaches lead
to different results vis-a-vis a wrongful death action by the beneficiaries of the infant.

B. Wrongful Death Actions
The causative approach does not recognize the fetus as a person
until birth. Therefore, if it dies before term, no action can be
derived through it.73 Under the civil law, "advantage" is the donor
of the rights, and, if the fetus dies, there can be no derivative action because it could not be of any possible advantage to it to
grant a recovery to its beneficiaries; a variation on this line of
reasoning is the double fiction employed by some modem codes.74
Under the biological approach, however, life is the donor of the
rights; since once there is life there can also be death, the infant's
action will be transmissible to its beneficiaries upon its death
in utero.
A number of American courts have been called upon to decide
whether the parents of a fetus that died in utero may recover under
wrongful death statutes. The first American case allowing such an
action was Verkennes v. Corniea. 715 In that case the mother suffered
a ruptured uterus during labor that resulted in the death of both
herself and her child. It was alleged that the attending doctor and
the hospital were guilty of medical negligence in that she had not
been furnished with the necessary care and treatment. The hospital's
72. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. &: C. 227 (1924); Joubert, 26 TYD. vm HED. R-H
REG. 295-97 (1963); Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1932); Note, 15 HARV. L. REv. 313
(1901). There is also a suggestion of this approach in Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
364-65, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960); see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Cannon in
Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.LR. 337, 367-68.
73. It is this fact that causes Del Tufo's about face. Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 61, 66 (1960).
74. CODE CIVIL (AUSTRIA} art. 22, based upon DIGEST 50.16.129.
75. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
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demurrer to the father's claim was dismissed. The court relied on
Bonbrest v. Kotz, Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, and Judge Boggs'
dissent in Allaire, all of which, instead of supporting such a cause
of action, in fact clearly opposed such a sweeping view. 76 In the next
case, Rainey v. Horn 77 (again a malpractice suit78), the court reversed
the trial judge's grant of a directed verdict, referring the matter back
to the jury to allow it to consider the allegations of negligence.
As a result of these two decisions, one might perhaps entertain
the suspicion that the courts, upset no doubt at Smith v. Luckhardt,79 were descending upon doctors. But subsequent decisions
were not confined to malpractice suits. Courts carried the biological
approach to the conclusion that a wrongful death action is available
even when there has not been live birth. so Other courts, however,
have balked at this extension and have held that the legal personality
of the fetus is conditioned by live birth.81
Medical knowledge made an invaluable contribution to that
class of cases in which an injured infant stood at the bar of the
court, since it buttressed the law's desire to compensate. But the
question of wrongful death actions is pure policy and peculiarly
within the lawyer's domain; thus scientific contribution in this
situation is not helpful, and two courts have finally drawn the line
beyond which medicine is unable to goad the law.
76. "It is but natural justice that such an infant, if born alive, should be allowed
to maintain an action..••" Boggs, J., in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359,
372 (1900). "Therefore when it was subsequently born alive and viable it was clothed
with all the rights of action which it would have had if actually in existence at the
date of the accident." Lamont, J., in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4
DL.R. 337, 344. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), relied heavily on the
Montreal T.ramways decision, and the whole judgment is specifically grounded on
"survivorship."
77. 221 Miss. 269, 77 So. 2d 434 (1954).
78. It was alleged that before the mother went into labor the attending physician
negligently attempted to force the birth of the baby by forceps. It was further alleged
that the doctor began the attempt by using his hands and upon failure braced his feet
against the mother and tugged with all his strength for a period of between fifteen
and forty minutes to no avail. The mother was finally taken to a hospital where she
gave birth to a stillborn child. The defense relied upon the allegation that the baby
had turned in a manner that made normal delivery impossible; that, because the
umbilical cord threatened to strangle it, the doctor attempted to return the child to
a normal position; and that, after failure, the doctor attempted the forceps delivery.
79. 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939), where the doctor negligently determined
a pregnancy to be a malignant tumor and applied radiation therapy. See text accompanying note 241 infra.
80. E.g., Worgan v. Greggo &: Ferraro, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter
v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712 (Chatham Sup. Ct. 1955); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955).
81. E.g., Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Keyes v. Construction Serv.
Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., 210
Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221
(1958); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
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In Hogan v. MacDaniel 82 it was stated that, although medical
science had experienced a great advance, the medical profession
cannot create a right of action at law.83 And, in Drabbels v. Skelly
Oil Co.,8¼ the court, noting that the question of whether a child
born alive may sue for prenatal injuries was not before it, held that,
while medical science may accelerate the birth of a viable child
and thereby accelerate the time it comes into juridical existence
as a person independent of the mother, it does not provide convincing authority that a child born dead ever becomes a person
insofar as the law of torts is concerned.85
A wide split of authority has developed, and the biologists
have advocated a "once a person always a person" rule, embracing
it as a matter of logic.86 We now have come to the position that, although originally it was illogical not to extend the rules of property
law to tort law, when faced with the property law requirement
of subsequent live birth we are irresistibly led to the contradiction
of that extension as a matter of logic!
The primary dispute, of course, centers on the relevancy of
birth. The biologists have their champions, and, clutching the
epithets "arbitrary," "unjust," "illogical," and "intolerable," they
have dismissed birth as being without significance. 87 If we want to
talk in terms of logic-a requirement to which no system of law
can ever wholly subscribe-we may just as well say that it is illogical for majority to begin at twenty-one years of age or that an infant
is irrebuttably incapable of criminal intention on a Thursday but
not on a Friday. Law requires some definitive clear-cut lines,
particularly one which heralds the beginning of legal personality.
It is inaccurate to characterize the law of status as arbitrary,88 if
that word is ever to have any meaningful content. Nor is an argu82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
Id. at 243, 319 S.W.2d at 224.
155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
Id. at 23, 50 N.W.2d at 236.
See Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
Del Tufo, supra note 73; Stewart, supra note 54, at 535-41; Note, 110 U. PA.
L, REv. 553, 556, 562 (1962).
At the moment of birth-and a child ought to be considered as live born if there
is any sign of life (i.e., heart beat, muscular movement, or respiration) after it has
been delivered altogether outside the body of the mother whether or not the cord
has been cut (NESBrIT, PERINATAL Loss IN MODERN Ossnmucs 13 (1957)]-the child
receives from the law the grant of legal personality. Thus, if it were to die shortly
afterwards from injuries received in utero, the beneficiaries could sue under the statutes. See Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Hall v. Murphy, 236
S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); New York Law Revision Comm'n, Communication
to the Legislature Relating to Prenatal Injuries, Jan. 23, 1935.
88. See 2 HARPER 8c JAMES, TORTS §§ 18,3., at 1031 (1956), wherein the view is expressed that "arbitrariness" will always be the precipitate when lines have to be drawn.
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ment putting cases on both sides of the line any more convincing.89
Birth is an occurrence of such magnitude that this kind of syllogistic appeal is somewhat hazardous logic. On one side of the
line, the wrongful death action is supported by an important policy
interest, and the question that arises is whether the so-called logic
that takes us over to the other side may also validly invoke the same
policy foundation. For, if not, we are asked to untidy a jurisprudential cupboard for no reason whatsoever, certainly not for justice. Law
receives its acceptance through the ends that it seeks to achieve, not
through satisfying a logical progression after prima facie scanning.
To attack the requirement of live birth is, practically speaking,
to abandon an interest in the fetus and to embrace a policy that
declares that the beneficiaries of a stillborn infant ought to recover under the wrongful death statutes. This is not justifiable,
and clearly our knowledge of science does not push us over any
line where, in an earlier and different situation, ignorance checked
our steps.
The hardship of many of the decisions denying relief lay in the
fact that they required an infant to go through life, as it was so aptly
put, bearing the seal of another's fault. 90 There is no such justification in the wrongful death situation. 91 Moreover, the infant is not
a "breadwinner." Lord Campbell's Act92 was originally designed to
avoid the hardship of the common law that so often resulted in a
deceased's dependents being put out onto the street. Although it is
true that parents have been able to recover substantially for the
loss of a minor child, the grant of compensation to the beneficiaries
of such a minor, and a fortiori to the parents of an infant in utero,
is in reality compensation for sentimental loss framed as though it
were pecuniary loss. 93 The award is pure speculation and is duplicity
89. See, e.g., Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. R.Ev. 443
(1899).
90. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, 344.
91. "We are therefore not concerned here with whether an action may be maintained by a child injured while en ventre sa mere and born alive, and intimate no
opinion thereabout, but where the mother suffered a miscarriage after approximately
five and a half months of pregnancy. The policy considerations which call for a right
of action when a child survives do not necessarily apply in the absence of survivorship."
West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 375 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
A New York court also stated that: "The considerations of justice which militate
in favor of a right of action to compensate a living child for its lack of health do not
support a cause of action in behalf of the parents of a stillborn infant for their possible pecuniary loss." In re Logan's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (Surr.
Ct. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
92. The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Viet. c. 93, which was the forerunner of,
and has become the generic name for, similar statutes.
93. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 105, 715 (2d ed. 1955).
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of the same genus Professor Keeton so persuasively attacked in his
article.94
A fundamental basis of tort law is the provision of compensation
to an innocent plaintiff for the loss that he has suffered. Tort law
is not, as a general rule, premised upon punishing the wrongdoer.
It is not submitted that the tortious destroyer of a child in utero
should be able to escape completely by killing instead of merely
maiming. But it is submitted that to compensate the parents any
further than they are entitled by well-settled principles of law and
to give them a windfall through the estate of the fetus is blatant
punishment.95 The actual-pecuniary-loss basis of compensation in
wrongful death actions has, where the award will be based on speculation, given way in some states to a fixed sum of money. It has been
suggested that the same principles be adopted in the unborn plaintiff
class of case.96 One ought to be wary not only of overlooking the
exceptional character of uterine personality and the basic raison
d' ~tre of the wrongful death remedy, but also of returning to archaism and to looking upon a child as a chattel.
The windfall to the beneficiaries is granted only by an insistence
that potential natural personality demands the recognition of legal
personality and that both begin with existence. The civil law stands
diametrically opposed to this view, but even in the common law
an incongruous position is reached in that there is a tort rule
applying to the child in utero that is different from the property
rule. It can only be hoped that this schizophrenia will be cured by
future courts ignoring Verkennes v. Corniea.91

C. The California Approach
California must be treated separately. Section 29 of its civil
code provides that: "A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be
94. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 463 (1962).
95. The motber has not been able to recover for injuries to tbe child. See, e.g.,
Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S.W. 889 (1911); Butler v. Manhattan Ry.,
143 N.Y. 417, 38 N.E. 454 (1894). Nor has her action for a miscarriage been allowed to
include the loss of tbe unborn child. See, e.g., Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315
(1899); Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d 114 (1942); cf. Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala.
615, 151 So. 468 (1933).
But tbe motber can recover for tbe additional pain and suffering inflicted upon
her. Ephrem v. Phillips, 99 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Witrak. v. Nassau
Electric Ry. Co., 52 App. Div. 234, 65 N.Y.S. 257 (1900); Bovee v. Donville, 53 Vt. 183
(1880); and for her anxiety caused by fear of a miscarriage of her child's deformity.
Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522 (1908); Carter v. Public Serv. Coordinated
Transp., 47 N.J. Super. 379, 136 A.2d 15 (1957).
96. Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act, l HARV. J. LEG. 28, 34-35, 42
(1964).
97. 229 Minn. 365 (1949); see text accompanying note 76 supra.
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deemed an ex1stmg person, so far as may be necessary for its
interests in the event of its subsequent birth."98
In Scott v. McPheeters, 99 it was held that the word "interests"
is general in its application and inclusive of both personal and
proprietary rights. In that case an eleven-year-old plaintiff alleged
that during her delivery the defendant's negligent use of forceps and
clamps had caused serious injuries to her brain and spine, resulting
in permanent paralysis. The court, in overruling the order of a
lower court which had upheld a demurrer, remarked that the
common law of the United States was diametrically opposed to
section 29. It could find no case either in the United States or the
rest of the world in which similar statutes had been involved. (Actually, California law is almost indistinguishable from the civil law
practice.)
In Norman v. Murphy, 100 the court again had an opportunity
to consider the code provision. This time the critical question was
the relationship of the words "in the event of its subsequent birth"
to the meaning of "a minor person." Here a husband and wife
brought an action to recover damages for the death of their unborn
child, who had died as a result of an automobile accident. At the
time of the accident, the mother was approximately four and onehalf months pregnant. The court was required to decide whether
such a fetus was "a minor person" within the meaning of those
words in the wrongful death action provision of the Code of Civil
Procedure. 101 The wrongful death action in California is not derivative, so the court apparently felt that it could not determine
the question by complete reliance on section 29. After quoting that
section and referring to section 270 of the Penal Code 102 and the
definition of "a minor person" in sections 25 and 26 of the Civil
Code, the court held: "[E]ven if the courts of this state should now
hold that an unborn viable child is 'a person' within the meaning of
our law, it could not be held to be a minor person." 103
98. CIV. CODE § 29.
99. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939), petition for rehearing denied, 93 P.2d
562 (1939).
100. 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P .2d 178 (1954).
IOI. C1v. CODE § 377: "When the death of a person not being a minor, or when
the death of a minor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or wife or
child or children or father or mother, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages
against the person causing the death."
102. Section 270 requires a father to support a legitimate or an illegitimate minor
child. Children conceived, but not yet born, are specifically included within that section. The court argued that, if unborn children were "minors," there would be difficulty in understanding why this specific inclusion was written into the section.
103. Id. at 100.

February 1965]

The Unborn Plaintiff

597

Unfortunately, the reasoning of the court smacks of artificiality; it would have been much easier to have held that section 29
is a condition to personality and that without live birth there can
be no person at all, rather than to create in California three categories of persons--unborn persons, minor persons, and major persons.

III. Two

OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS

A. Foreseeability
The recognition in law of the unborn plaintiff has proceeded
with little discussion as to the impact it has made upon fundamental
principles in the law of torts.
If we assume a case wherein a pregnant woman has been injured
and, as a result of her pregnancy, the injuries she suffers are increased, the fact of her pregnancy may be regarded as an abnormal
susceptibility on her part. 104 There is no doubt that she will be
able to recover for any additional or special injury under the "victim talem qualem," "thin skull," or "old soldier" rule.105 The
application of this rule is under the broad heading of "remoteness
of damage" or "compensation"-the second step in a negligence
action, the first step being a consideration of culpability. It proceeds
upon a consideration of the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.
Here the Riskers106 and the Polemists107 part ways. The former
embrace a philosophy that foreseeability is all; 108 and, since two
leading exponents of the risk principle on both
, sides of the Atlantic flatly accept the victim talem qualem rule as an exception
to that principle,109 the question may be asked whether by accepting the fact of pregnancy as too remote, and therefore not foreseeable for purposes of compensation, the fetus is also not foreseeable
for the purposes of culpability. To the extent that Polemis is authority for the narrow relational test (equivalent to Palsgraf 10 in the
United States) the opponents of the risk principle are also faced with
the problem111 of whether in the prenatal injury cases the courts
should allow unforeseeable plaintiffs to sue.
Some of the American courts may have been aware of a duty
104.
105.
106.
107.

HART &: HONORf, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 161 (1959).

See text accompanying note 186 infra.
See Honore, Book Review, 77 HAltv. L. REY. 595, 599 (1964).
That is, those who embrace the principle of In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560,
that a negligent actor is responsible for all the direct consequences of his negligent
act. E.g., HART 8c HONORE, op. dt. supra note 104; Note, 1961 CAMB. L.J. 30.
108. McKerron, Foreseeability Is All, 78 S.A.L.J. 282 (1961).
109. KttroN, LEGAL CAUSE IN nu: LAW OF TORTS 67-68 (1963); Williams, The Risk
Principle, 77 L.Q. REY. 179, 193-97 (1961).
110. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
111. Dias, Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy, 1962 CAMB. L.J. 178, 179.
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problem; 112 in Drobner v. Peters, 118 the court held: "No liability
can arise ... except out of a duty disregarded and defendant owed
no duty of care to the unborn child . . . apart from the duty
to avoid injuring the mother."114
Certain writers have denied that a duty problem was ever real
to the courts and have accused them of duplicity.ms But this attitude solves nothing and is question-begging. Perhaps the abovequoted words mean no more than that no duty of care can be
owed to a legal nonentity. This could have been the position
in 1921, but by 1946, at least, the advance in medicine had
exerted its influence on the law and had led to an acceptance
of the fetus as an independent person in being: that is, both
a person in whom legal personality could reside and an independent person to whom a duty of care could be owed. But,
whatever the conundrums of Drobner might have been, the Texas
court in Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. ]ordan 116 met the
issue directly in holding that, since the reasonable man's conscious
care and solicitude are for the expectant mother and not for the
unborn child apart from her, his obligations and liability in damages for his acts should be measured and determined from his
viewpoint. 117
Professors Harper and James find this statement "amazing,''118
and, in attacking the decision, they invoke the example of a negligent
driver who has "care and solicitude" only for the solitary driver of
a bakery truck with which he collides and the pies within. Unknown
to the driver there are some children in the back of the truck who
are injured in the collision; the negligent driver is held liable for
their injuries. They go on to say that "the limitation of the Palsgraf
case contains no requirement that the interests within the range of
peril be known or identified in the actor's mind, or even be in
existence at the time of the negligence."119
112. See the writer's submission as to the Holmes opinion in Dietrich, text ac•
companying note 57 supra.
113. 232 N.Y. 220 (1921).
114. Id. at 224.
115. Thus Dean White wrote: "In fact, considerations of duty are never the sub•
stantive reasons for a: decision but only the legal sounding explanation for it." White,
The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 383, 401 (1952). See also
Payne, Foresight and Remoteness of Damage in Negligence, 25 MODERN L. REv. 1, 18
(1962).
116. 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
117. Id. at 359, 78 S.W.2d at 949.
118. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.3, at 1030 (1956).
119. Ibid. The actor's knowledge requirement was applied only in Walker's case.
One text writer applauds the holding of non-liability because the company did not
know of the child's existence. WINFIELD, TORTS 71·72 (7th ed. 1963). This is reminiscent
of the "tumor cases," justifying liability on the part of doctors because they obviously
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Perhaps the learned authors have been a little harsh in their
criticism, for it is arguable that the court was not thinking in this
subjective sense, but was postulating the anticipation of the reasonable man, who saddles the instant defendant with responsibility
only insofar as he (the reasonable man) knows the interests to be
within the range of peril. This becomes clear when regard is had
to the court's further holding that: "We think that tested by the
knowledge, experience and conduct of the ordinary prudent man,
it 'owed no duty of care to the unborn child in the present case,
apart from the duty to avoid injuring the mother.' " 120
It is true that this statement is similar to that delivered in Drobner, but with this important distinction: the Texas court by its
preamble set a standard, whereas the Drobner court merely stated a
conclusion. A causal approach cannot avoid the issue, 121 because it is
still open to the defendant to say that he, as a reasonable man, could
not have anticipated the presence of an unborn child within the
risks created by his conduct.
Professor Goodhart, who has been the leading exponent of the
abolition of a distinction between foreseeability for the purpose
of culpability and foreseeability for the purpose of compensation,
was driven to submit that in fact it is reasonably foreseeable that
a victim may suffer from an unusual susceptibility.122 Dr. Williams
disagreed, submitting that there is a distinction with respect to
foreseeability between the test of initial liability and the test of
extent of liability. 123 Pregnancy as an unusual susceptibility is
relevant not only to the question of quantum but also to the
question of liability. Therefore, we are required to take the fact of
pregnancy out of the victim talem qualem category and place it
squarely within the risk principle. Dr. Williams would rationalize
the matter in the last resort under his doctrine of transferred negligence,124 but it does seem essential that the standard be reformuhave knowledge of the mother's condition. In terms of established tort principle, this
view is quite objectionable. See also FLEMING, TORTS 158 (1957). But this is not what
the Texas court embraced.
120. 124 Tex. at 355, 78 S.W.2d at 947. (Emphasis added.)
121. SALMOND, TORTS 81-82 (13th ed. 1961). The author states that it is difficult to
see how a duty of care can be owed to an unborn person, but takes this question
no further since he finds the real issue to be whether a living plaintiff has a
right not to be injured by acts done before its birth.
122. Goodhart, Liability and Compensation, 76 L.Q. REv. 567, 581 (1960); Note,
78 L.Q. REv. 160, 161-62 (1962). This drew a retort from Dias in a note in 1961 CAMB.
L.J. 23, 27: "If the full extent of the injury is somehow regarded as being foreseeable
'the average reasonable man' and 'the man on the Clapham omnibus' will have to
give way to some new and nameless figure credited with far greater powers than his
predecessors."
123. Williams, supra note 109, at 175.
124. If Dr. Williams regards "advanced in pregnancy" as being any sort of require-

600

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:579

lated to ensure that Scarlett O'Hara also tumbles down the stairs
of foresight in law.
Alternatively, we must answer Professor Keeton's question of
whether we consider the plaintiff within some class of persons to
whom risk could be foreseen, the class being circumscribed by the
limits of the risk,125 by stating that conduct which creates a risk of
harm to a woman includes also a risk of harm to her unborn child,
if any.
B. Causation 126
Once upon a time there was a camel that carried loads across
the desert for its master, who had never loaded the animal too
heavily. One day a prankster negligently placed a straw on top of
a load and the camel collapsed, falling to the ground with a broken
back. 127 Lawyers, to the horror of the medical profession, 128 often
embrace the last straw theory of causation. Given an act or omission but for which the harm would not have ensued, the law may
hold the actor liable for all damages.
The doctor has another view of causation. His emphasis is
upon the initial rather than the immediate cause, with only a few
exceptions such as the situation where A negligently dispenses
poison pills that B swallows some weeks later; here the doctor considers the taking of the poison as the cause of B's death, while to
the lawyer, the cause was the negligent dispensing.129
In prenatal injury cases, the doctor, as an expert witness,180 will
be asked to establish causation in the legal sense, and in so
doing he will be dealing with a concept of causation that is not
only foreign to his concept of cause or etiology, but is also foreign
to the traditions of his science.181 Scientific cause is firmly rooted
ment, then, if maternal appearance is going to be a criterion, he is coming frightfully
close to the unjust viability test or the unfair knowledge test.
125. KEEToN, op. cit. supra note 109, at 83. See also CLARK &: LINDSELL, TOR.TS § 702
(12th ed. 1961).
126. There are so many theories of causation and such a great deal has been writ•
ten on this subject that it would be impossible to report, let alone attempt to reconcile,
them within the scope of this paper. I have had to make an election and, in so doing,
confess the choice to be purely personal. Recent writings in this field include: 2 HAR.PER.
&: JAMES, TOR.TS ch. 20 (1956); HART&: HONORE, CAUSATION IN TIIE LAW (1959); Kn:roN,
op. cit. supra note 109; PROSSER, TORTS § 44, at 219-~ (2d ed. 1955): Williams, Causa•
tion in the Law, 1961 CAMB. L.J. 62.
127. This example is taken with modifications from the opinion of Chief Justice
Bernstein in Tatman v. Provincial Homes, 382 P .2d 573 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 196!1).
128. See Powers, After All Doctors Are Human, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 46ll, 477 (196!1);
Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause, !H TEXAS L. REv. 6l!O, 6lll (195!1).
129. The example is taken from Williams, supra note 126, at 64.
130. There seems little doubt but that the question of causation in prenatal injury
cases will require expert testimony. See Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847
(1947); llO U. PA. L. REv. 553, 590 (1962).
131. Small, supra note 128, at 648-56.
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on a principle of repetition-there is a tendency to relate statistical
relevance to causal relevance. This is not to say, however, that such
absurdity results as finding a causal relevance between motor accidents and nylon stockings because most women involved in the
former wear the latter. The doctor's cause tends to be something
he has already proved. To him causes are either notorious or unknown, and, to the frustration of the lawyer, the area in between
presents only possibilities.
Lawyers do not rank causes; percentages are not tacked onto
them. In one case and in one set of circumstances the lawyer seeks
to close the causal link by proving that degree of factual relevancy
the law is prepared to label as a cause.132 The lawyer does not seek
the cause but a cause,183 and in his search he asks the question, but
for act A would harm B have resulted. If the answer is in the
negative and if its probity is not so slight as to warrant being
discarded under the de minimis principle,134 then the lawyer's
task as to causation, although not necessarily as to liability, is
complete. Liability is fixed by balancing all the causes-called
causes-in-fact. If on balance a cause that can be attributed to the
defendant's fault is isolated as the more important, he is saddled
with responsibility.
The gulf between the professions is the difference between
scientific integrity and policy expediency. Mutual frustration flows
between.
Doctors, unfortunately, employ legal-sounding tests; Dr. Fraser
has written that: "Proof of a causal association requires evidence
that the factor occurs more often in pregnancies giving rise to
malformed children than in pregnancies giving rise to normal
children."185 This is not the lawyer's test of a cause-in-fact; it is an
expression of the test by which responsibility is determined. The
balancing of probabilities is a procedure; the result is as variable
as the factual circumstances of any two cases.
Prenatal injury cases will in the foreseeable future be tried
with a crowd of medical witnesses, and it ought to be understood
132. But see PROSSER., To.RTS § 44 (2d ed. 1955). Although the singular word "cause"
is used here for the purpose of clarity, there is never a single, isolated cause of any occurrence. In addition there is often more than one cause justifying liability on the part
of the particular defendant. I have merely attempted to illustrate the process whereby
a "cause" is characterized. In a trial this process is repeated a number of times.
133. 2 HARP.ER &: JAMES, TORTS § 20.2, at 1110 (1956).
134. See, e.g., McKE.R.RoN, THE I.Aw OF DELier 258 (1959).
135. Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRONIC
DISEASES 97, 107 (1959).
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that all the law requires is a matching of causes. One of them
it calls the legal cause, and the isolation that follows this appellation should not be taken to mean that it is the only cause. It is
merely the only cause with which Justice may saddle the ·wrongdoer with liability. That is where it seeks its validity-not in scientific isolation.
The victim talem qualem rule presents problems to doctors.
It is merely an expression of a legal policy that a wrongdoer must take his victim with all his susceptibilities, abnormalities,
and propensities. Thus, in Smith v. Leech, Brain & Co., 186 the
plaintiff's husband was employed by the defendant company as a
galvanizer. His duties consisted of lowering articles into a tank of
molten metal. Once, while so engaged, a piece of metal spattered
out and burned his lip. The workman died of cancer, his tissues
at the time of the accident being in a pre-malignant condition. The
defendants were held liable for the death of their employee, the
court having found that the burn caused the cancer. This ought
not to be understood to mean that lawyers embrace, as a
scientific principle, the belief that burns cause cancer; it only means
that where a pre-existing dangerous condition is aggravated by a
burn on the lip, that burn is the legal cause of the cancer.
The trauma-causation field is the battleground of medico-legal
dispute, and, as most of the cas_es relating to prenatal injuries have
dealt with allegations of a traumatic cause, it is to be expected that
further professional difficulties will occur. 137
In those jurisdictions in which the courts have allowed ·wrongful
death actions to be brought by the beneficiaries of stillborn infants,
the fact of an unhealthy pregnancy quite probably may be regarded
as irrelevant because of the victim talem qualem rule and the
defendant held liable for causing the abortion. Difficulties might
arise, however, if it could be established-and it seems that this
will have to be done by the defendant-that the health of the fetus
was such that it would have inevitably and of its own accord
aborted. If this can be established, the defendant ought not to be
held liable. 138
136. (1961] 3 All E.R. 1159. See also Gulf Ref. Co. v. Atchison, 196 F.2d 258 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 833 (1952); Love v. Port Authority, [1959] Ll. L. Rep. 541.
137. EASTMAN &: HELLMAN, WILLIAMS' 0BSTE"IRICS 531-32 (12th ed. 1961). See also
Hertig, Minimal Criteria Required To Prove a Prima Facie Case of Traumatic Abortion, 117 ANN. SURGERY 496 (1943). See text at note 272 infra.
138. See 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 20.3, at 1122-23 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 44, at
219-20 (2d ed. 1955); Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1127 (1934).
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RELEVANT MEDICAL DATA139

A. Research in the Area
As we have seen, during the formative period of the law the
courts denied relief to the infant plaintiffs, not upon any basic jurisprudential foundation, but upon errors of science. Medicine also
proceeded for years upon the supposition that the cause of congenital malformation lay in hereditary factors. The landmarks in
medical knowledge respecting the role of environmental factors were
reached almost simultaneously with those of the law.
Gregg's paper on the Rubella virus appeared in 1942.140 In the
1950's, irradiation was convincingly indicted,141 and we have in
recent years witnessed the devastating consequences of a sleeping
drug.142 .
As of the present day, doctors and investigators are satisfied
that environment plays an integral role in the etiology of congenital
malformations; 143 there is general agreement that environment can
be a catalyst to heredity, 144 and vice versa. Areas of disagreement
are, on the whole, confined to whether specific environmental influences are causes of malformations. We have considered the
difficulties present in the concept of medical cause. 145 It seems advisable not to limit the inquiry in this manner, but to consider
also those factors present in the fetal environment that might contribute to congenital malformations.
Environmental factors may be broadly divided into two classes:
environmental deficiencies and environmental agents. Under the
139. See Appendix infra.
140. Gregg, Congenital Cataract Following German Measles in the Mother, 3 TR.
OPTH. Soc'y AUSTRALIA 35 (1941). See text accompanying note 202 infra.
141. Miller, Delayed Effects Occurring Within the First Decade After Exposure of
Young Individuals to Hiroshima Atomic Bomb, 18 PEDIATRICS I (1956); Plummer, Anomalies Occurring in Children Exposed in Utero to the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima, 10
PEDIATRICS 687 (1952); Yamazaki et al., A Study of the Outcome of Pregnancy in Women
Exposed to the Atomic Blast in Nagasaki, 43 J. CELL PHYSI0L. (Supp. 1 1954) 319. See
text accompanying note 223 infra.
142. Lenz &: Knapp, Thalidomide Embryopath'j, 5 ARCH. ENv. HEALTH 100 (1962).
Sec text accompanying note 249 infra.
143. EAsTMAN &: HELLMAN, WILLIAMS' OBSTETRICS 527 (12th ed. 1961). See generally
NESBITI', PERINATAL Loss IN MODERN OBSTETRICS 237-68 (1957) [hereinafter referred to as
NESnITTJ; Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRON.
DIS. 97 (1959); Fraser 8: Fainstat, Causes of Congenital Defects, 82 AM. J. DIS. CHILD.
593 (1951); Gruenwald, Mechanisms of Abnormal Development (pts. 1-3), 44 ARcH.
PATH. 398, 495, 648 (1947); Inghalls, Causes and Prevention of Developmental Defects,
161 A.M.A.J. 1047 (1956); Penrose, Heredity and Environment in the Causation of
Foetal Malformation, 166 PRACTITIONER 429 (1951); Wacker, Congenital Abnormalities,
86 AM. J. OBST. &: GYNEC. 310 (1963); Warkany &: Kalter, Congenital Malformations
(pts. 1·2), 265 NEW ENG. J. MED, 993, 1046 (1961).
144. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 7 (6th ed. 1954); Warkany &: Kalter, supra
note 143, at 1050.
145. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
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first heading may be assigned socio-economic factors, 146 geographical factors, 147 nutritional deficiencies,148 maternal age149 and
health, 150 and psychological elements,151 all of which may be relevant
to the intrauterine development of the infant.
146. This is closely related to nutritional factors, as the lower the status the poorer
the diet tends to become.
147. See, e.g., Edwards, Congenital Malformations of the Central Nervous System
in Scotland, 12 BRIT. J. PREV. &: SocIAL MED. 115 (1958); Penrose, Genetics of Anencephaly, 1 J. MENT. DEFic. REs. 4 (1957); cf. Hewitt, Geographical Variations in the
Mortality Attributed to Spina Bifida and Other Congenital Malformations, 17 BRIT.
J. PREV. &: SOCIAL MED. 13 (1963).
148. There has been a vast amount of research in · this field. Primarily this has
been related to maternal diets in animals. It was determined that specific vitamin
deficiencies produced defects. Warkany, Congenital Malformations Induced by Maternal
Dietary Deficiency, 13 NUTRITION REv. 289 (1955). See also MoNTAGU, PRENATAL lNFLU•
ENCES 57-112 (1962) [hereinafter referred to as MoNTAGu]. Montagu expresses concern
at the "fashionable" practice of adolescent females to remain slim through poor diets.
That, combined with the increasing trend toward young marriages and pregnancies,
creates a situation in which the mother often cannot provide a satisfactory environment for the healthy building of another body. Id. at 59.
See also Fraser &: Fainstat, supra note 143, at 598-600; Sontag &: Wines, Relation of
Mothers' Diets to Status of Their Infants at Birth and in Infancy, 54 AM. J. OBSTET. &:
GYNEC. 994 (1947); Tompkins, The Underweight Patient as an Increased Obstetric
Hazard, 69 AM. J. OBSTET. &: GYNEC. 114 (1955).
There is almost no scope for legal liability here, as, whatever relevance the maternal
diet has, pre-conception dietary behavior and socio-economic factors provide too wide
and all encompassing variables for any duty to be distilled. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v.
Rankin, 59 Wash. 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962); cf. 110 U. PA. L. REv. 553, 582-8!! (1962).
The only "unequivocal" link to be established between the maternal diet and defects in humans are the iodine deficiencies that give rise to endemic cretinism. This
has provided a particular problem for Switzerland. See MoNTAGU 97; WRIGHT, INTRO·
DUCTION TO PATHOLOGY, ETIOLOGY, THE CAUSES OF ABNORMALITIES AND DISEASES (3d ed.
1958), quoted in CURRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 29, 33 (1960).
Too much iodine, on the other hand, has caused the same condition. Galina, Iodides
During Pregnancy, 267 A.M.A.J. 1124 (1962).
149. The optimum childbearing age is between twenty-three and twenty-eight.
MONTAGU 117. GLAISTER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY 358 (11th ed. 1962),
has collected data on maternal age at childbirth. This ranges from an incredible five
years eight months to past fifty. In the September 20, 1963 issue of Time Magazine, a
prize is reported for the submission of documentary evidence of a birth that will "beat"
the "record" of one Hilda Gosney who gave birth at the age of fifty years seven
months! Id. at 102.
150. Rubella and syphilis are dealt with in the text accompanying notes 202-22 infra.
Pregnancy can give rise to a maternal toxemic condition, the exact cause of which
is unknown although numerous theories from hereditary factors to the uterine localization of the placenta abound. See Beinarz, in VILLEE, GESTATION 109 (1959). The condition may affect the fetus. MoNTAGU 241. The issue of diabetic women have a high
mortality rate. But what is important to the lawyer is the fact that a diabetic who has
been subjected to a traumatic experience such as a motor vehicle collision may experience an aggravation of her condition with resulting deleterious consequences for the
fetus. Again, a traumatic experience can push a pre-diabetic mother over the line. A
defendant can be responsible in both these cases for whatever aggravation may ensue.
See Joslin, The Relation of Trauma to Diabetes, 177 ANN. SURG. 607 (1943). See also
CURRAN, LAw AND MEDICINE 51 n.18 (1960).
In Valence v. Louisiana Light&: Power Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. 1951), a mother alleged
that she was between two and four months pregnant when she was a passenger in a bus
that was negligently driven off the road into a ditch. The mother apparently received
"only a slight jolt," but shortly afterwards she experienced a slight uterine discharge
and a week later she was confined to a hospital for ten days. Five and one-half months
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On the other hand, environmental agents are, broadly speaking,
not subtractions, but positive influences. Medical science today can
condemn with varying degrees of certainty a wide variety of
teratogenic agents and stimuli that are capable of effecting
abnormalities. 152
It is obviously not permissible or feasible for experiments to
be carried out upon humans, 153 and the studies that have been
undertaken must all be considered subject to a number of qualifications that may be relevant to their overall validity and acceptance.154
The problem of the accuracy in human investigation relates, inter
alia, to maternal memory and bias, the necessity for retrospective
investigation, the paucity of subjects, and the differences between
the methods used by the various investigators and their differing
views as to what constitutes a malformation. 155
Hope for more accuracy in the future is to be found in the
Collaborative Perinatal Research Project, presently carrying out its
work at Bethesda, Maryland. There it is intended to follow up the
outcome of approximately fifty thousand pregnancies in order to examine in depth the precise effect of already suspect factors, to investigate and identify factors not presently suspect, and to elucidate the
mechanism by which these factors exert their influence. As of June
1963, 36,500 women were under study, approximately 29,000 had
already been delivered, and 17,400 one-year-old children had been
after the accident she gave birth to a stillborn infant weighing an incredible fourteen
pounds. There was evidence that the mother was a diabetic who, five years before the
accident, had given birth to a stillborn child. In addition, there was some evidence that
she had failed to adhere to her diet. Her contention was that as a result of the accident she had been required to stay in bed for a large part of the gestation period
and that her resultant obesity produced the secondary result that her child's weight
also became excessive. The court, in rejecting this explanation, held that the lack of
exercise and increased weight of the mother could not have affected the fetus. Noting
her previous history, the fact that she was a diabetic, and the mortality rate of children from such mothers, the court refused to grant any relief, stating that only a
layman might attribute the result to the accident.
151. See Yankauer, An Evaluation of Prenatal Care and Its Relationship to Sodal
Class and Sodal Disorganization, 43 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1001 (1953).
152. Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRON.
DIS. 97 (1959). The author of that article is prepared to implicate only five agents: (i)
radiation, therapeutic and atomic; (ii) rubella; (iii) toxoplasma organism; (iv) acute
folic acid deficiencies; (v) synthetic progestins. As we have seen, his definition of cause
is legally unacceptable. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 143, do not go much further.
153. HAMILTON, BOYD &: MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 206 (3d ed. 1962); Macintosh,
The Problem of Congenital Malformations, IO J. CHRON. DIS. 139, 142 (1959).
154, Fraser, supra note 152, at 100, sets out the methods presently adopted.
155. See Macintosh, supra note 153. Thus it is impossible to undertake any prospective investigations relating to toxaplasmosis, as a large number of women afflicted
with the disease do not know that they have it. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 14S, at
1047 (1961).
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subjected to examination.156 It is still too early for any authoritative
findings to be announced, but the investigators estimate that the
abnormal outcomes will include: 157
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Prematurity: 10 per cent.
Congenital malformations: 7 per cent.
Stillbirths and neo-natal deaths: 3.6 per cent.
Mental retardation: 3 per cent.

A great deal of the information we possess at present has resulted
from animal experimentation. This has its sequelae both for the
doctor and the lawyer, because the information must be considered
with a degree of caution. Two eminent teratologists, however, have
said:
"Thus, while one must caution that production of a specific
congenital malformation in a laboratory animal by a particular
means certainly does not imply that that defect has the same
etiology in man, these studies reveal the existence of embryologic instabilities in mammals that can be transformed into
malformations by environmental factors, and allude that such
phenomena may also exist during human prenatal life." 158
On the other hand, the position can be the reverse. For example,
aminopterin has a far more severe effect on human fetuses than
on rat fetuses.
B. Critical Times and Environmental Agents

The precise mechanism by which teratogenic agents exert their
influences is in many cases unknown. The popular hypothesis is
that described as the developmental arrest theory. 159
Embryologists have discovered and tabulated the sequences of
normal development,160 and it has been determined that, at specific
times and under genetic control, stages are reached at which the
156. The children will receive their final thorough examination when they reach
the age of seven years.
157. Collaborative Project Reporter, The Collaborative Perinatal Research Project:
5 Years of Progress, Autumn, 1963.
158. Warkany & Kalter, supra note 143, at 1049 (1961).
159. Inghalls, Causes and Prevention of Developmental Defects, 161 A.M.A.J. 1047
(1956). The theory itself is not novel. See OGSTON, LECTURES ON MEDICAL JuRISPRU·
DENCE 196 (1878). The great problem here relates to the fact that it is probably inaccurate to trace all abnormalities to one theory. The very word "arrest" would exclude
those factors that cause persons to become "giants" (usually genetic factors are involved in this situation). Dr. Inghalls has been accused of putting all his "eggs in one
basket." See Gruenwald's letter, in 162 A.M.A.J. 1077 (1956); Fraser's letter, in id. at
1651 (1956). It is extremely difficult for a lawyer to weigh all the pros and cons, for
the simple reason that doctors generally do not write for the benefit of lawyers. Thus,
everything Dr. Fraser writes in his letter must be read subject to his definition of
"cause,'' the problems of which are discussed in the text accompanying note 135 supra.
160. A table of the sequences is set out in AREY, op. cit. supra note 144, at 106.
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cells develop into tissues and organs. After this, at another critical
time, proliferation takes place from the foundations so laid. Now,
if a sufficient dosage of a teratogenic agent exerts its influence at one
of these critical times, it may be understood that either foundational
damage (i.e., the influence at a critical differentiating stage) or
secondary damage, in the sense of inhibiting or arresting the growth
of organs already formed, may result. 161 Overgrowth or failure to
regress162 is also conceivable, and it has been suggested that this
may result from excessive hormone stimulation.168
The critical stages in the differentiating phase occur within the
first trimester, and a teratogenic factor producing its insult at this
time will result in a great variety of defects, likely to be of a
serious nature.164 As the organs grow, their susceptibility to structural damage decreases, and arrest or degeneration will be the result
of an insult. Each organ, however, has its own critical stage, and
within the teratogenic zone the potential sequelae range from death
to major, minor, or no defects.165 Since a specific defect can be
caused by a variety of unrelated agents, it is hazardous to work
back from the deformity in the hope of isolating the cause.166
The variables are, therefore, the teratogenic dosage and the stage
of fetal development. Dr. Inghalls submits that the sequences of
normal development also determine the sequences of maldevelopment, and thus, given the malformation, it may be possible to determine the time at which the adverse influence was exerted. 167
Doctors Warkany and Kalter have warned, however, that:
"Another possible fallacy is attributing certain congenital malformations or syndromes to environmental events that coincide
with the time of embryological development of the part or parts
that became malformed . . . because in theory any interference with embryogenesis before such developmental milestones
could also be responsible for the defects or a mutational or
chromosomal aberration dating from before conception can
manifest itself at such a 'critical period.' " 168
They go on to submit, therefore, that it is permissible only to
apply the critical time basis as a means of determining the latest
time the origin of the malformation could have exerted its influence.
161. lnghalls, supra note 159, at 1051. •
162, NESBilT 237; PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 231-32 (2d ed. 1953).
163. Wilson, Experimental Studies on Congenital Malformations, 10 J. CHRON. DIS.
m. 115 (1959).
164. Id. at 119.
165. NESBilT 245-46.
166. Cf. PATTEN, op. cit. supra note 162, at 230.
167. Inghalls & Curley, Principles Governing the Genesis of Congenital Malformations Induced in Mice by Hypoxia, 257 NEW ENG. J. Mm. ll21, 1126 (1958).
168. Warkany & Kalter, supra note 143, at 1050.
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As a consequence, medical certainty will be found only in this
negative sense. However, the rendering of a dormant factor into an
active one is not necessarily excusable in law.169
Provided the malformation is such that an expert is able to
determine whether it is the result of foundational damage or
an arrest in proliferation, it is possible to state with reasonable
certainty when the environmental agent must have produced
its insult. The former malformation should have its origin in
the first trimester, but the latter not necessarily so. Therefore, a plaintiff suffering from structural damage may find it impossible to succeed in his cause of action if the alleged wrongful act
took place after the first trimester.
It must also be remembered that, if we accept that the factors
causing uterine death may also be responsible for sublethal damage,
this, combined with the fact that medical science is unable to account for the majority of prenatal deaths, means that medicine
cannot account for the majority of malformations either. This has
been so despite thorough post mortem examination of the infant
and accurate clinical data regarding the mother. 170
Teratogenic agents either upset the developmental pattern directly or affect it by subtracting an external component necessary
to healthy intrauterine life. The developmental arrest theory is
relevant not only to anatomical malformations, but also to mental
abnormalities, though doctors can speak with even less certainty as
to the etiology of the latter. Perinatal anoxia, however, has been
singled out as a possible cause of these mental deviations.
C. The Effects of Specific Environmental Agents
We all live in societies that are maimed by the high incidence
of cerebral palsy, epilepsy, mental retardation and deficiencies, behavior disorders, and minor impediments.
Doctors are now satisfied that not all these afflictions can be
attributed to hereditary factors, as studies of epilepsy have shown. 171
Since these disorders usually reveal themselves in childhood, investigators have increasingly looked toward the perinatal period in
order to ascertain their cause.

I. Anoxia
It is known that the greatest single cause of infant mortality is
anoxia, and, knowing that deprivation of oxygen can kill, it seems
169. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
170. NESBIIT 99; Wilson, supra. note 163, at 123.
171. BARROW 8: FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 7, 11-34 (1956). Cerebral palsy is in
addition rarely hereditary. NESBITI 191.
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reasonable to conclude that it may also maim. Investigators have
found that anoxia causes hemorrhages that may inflict serious damage to the coverings (pia mater; arachnoid) and white matter of
the brain. The resultant destruction of nerve cells can be associated
with the impairment of the function of certain areas of the brain. 172
The fetus, while in utero, is able to withstand without distress an
•
oxygen pressure that would be found at an altitude of some thirtythree thousand feet. But this capacity to withstand low oxygen pressures does not mean that the fetus is able to tolerate a depression of
its usual oxygen level for any appreciable length of time. 173
A link between hyperoxia (too much oxygen) and blindness
caused through retrolental fibroplasia has also been established.174
All these facts provide strong indicia which led Doctors Lilienfeld
and Passamanick to undertake a mammoth series of studies in an
attempt to link brain disorders to perinatal factors.
They have suggested the existence of a continuum of reproductive casualty which, ranging from death through cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, 175 mental deficiency,17 6 and behavior disorders177 to reading disorders,178 is statistically relevant to the complications of pregnancy and prematurity. Factors include the duration of labor,
malpresentations, multiple births, and placental disorders and diseases such as placenta previa, all of which may affect the maternal
oxygenated blood supply to the fetus.
Concurrent with these inquiries, studies have been conducted of
various drugs that can have a depressant effect on the respiratory
system. This effect may be direct, resulting in a fetal inability to
metabolize drugs that have passed transplacentally, or indirect, reacting upon the respiratory processes of the mother. 179
Anesthetics, certain analgesics (pain killers), and sedatives
have a depressant effect on the respiratory system, and thus Dr.
Montagu has submitted that, since all anesthetics and most sedative
172. MONTAGU 336-37.
173. Eastman, Mount Everest in Utero, 67 AM. J. OBST.&: GYNEC. 701, 707 (1954).
174. Id. at 711.
175. Lilicnfeld &: Pasamanick, The Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors With
the Development of Cerebral Palsy and Epilepsy, 70 AM. J. OBSTET. &: GYNEC. 93 (1955).
176. Lilienfeld &: Pasamanick, Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors With the
Development of Mental Deficiency (pt. 1), 159 A.M.A.J. 155 (1955) and see id. (pt. 2),
60 AM. J. MENT. DEFIC. 557 (1956). Prematurity was found to be of particular relevance
in these studies.
177. Pasamanick, Rogers &: Lilienfeld, Pregnancy Experience and the Development
of Behavior Disorder in Children, 112 AM. J. PSYCHIA1RY 613 (1956). See also Preston,
Late Behavioral Aspects Found in Cases of Prenatal, Natal and Postnatal Anoxia, 26
J. PEDIATlUCS 353 (1945).
178. Kawi &: Pasamanick, Association of Factors of Pregnancy With the Development
of Reading Disorders in Childhood, 166 A.M.A.J. 1420 (1958).
179. Sandberg, Drugs in Pregnancy, Their Effects on the Fetus and Newborn, 94
CALIF. MED. 287 (1961). See generally MONTACU 322-60; NESBI'IT 110, 355.
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and pain-relieving drugs serve to reduce the oxygen levels of both
mother and fetus, in those cases in which such drugs must be used
the obvious indication is that they should be used with the greatest
caution. 180
Dr. Inghalls attributes a great deal to anoxia; 181 Dr. Warkany is
dubious. 182 The cause of these serious disorders is unknown; but anoxia is conceivably a cause, and, that being so, it seems that Dr. Eastman's recommendation in his Presidential Address to the 64th Annual
Meeting of the American Association of Obstetricians ought to be
followed. He suggested that oxygen should be administered to the
mother as a matter of course during the last five to fifteen minutes
of childbirth in order to protect the baby which may require it. 188
It is not submitted tf.iat any such standard of obstetrical practice
be required by law. The law's strength really lies in its ability to
compensate. A preventive law in the sense of naked compulsion is
uncalled for against a body of men intimately concerned with prenatal salvage. Obstetric standards required by law are high enough.
The doctor who does not know the extent of the mother's anesthetized condition or who has not adopted impeccable care during
delivery may well be presented with an emergency. His capacity to
stay out of court is going to be directly proportional to his ability
to save the cyanosized infant by resuscitation techniques and his
gen~ral skill in handling the situation.184
2. -Diseases
Certain diseases entering into the fetal environment may have
serious effects upon the child. In this class of case, the limits of lia180. MONTAGU 341-42. See also Hellman&: Hingson, The Effect of Various Methods
of Obstetric Pain Relief on Infant Mortality, 53 N.Y.S.J. MED. 2767 (1953). •
181. Inghalls, Anoxia as a Cause of Fetal Death and Congenital Defect in the
Mouse, 80 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 34 (1950); Inghalls &: Curley, supra note 167, at ll21.
182. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 143, at 1047. See also Campbell, The Effects of
Neonatal Asphyxia, 25 ARcHIV. DIS. CHILD. 351 (1950). Neonatal asphyxia is not a common cause of later mental or physical retardation. Cf. Fraser, Neonatal Asphyxia, 171
A.M.A.J. 1028 (1959)-a note of his report to the 15th British Congress of Obstetrics
and Gynaecology, wherein he maintains a definite association exists between asphyxia at
birth and subsequent epilepsy, lack of coordination, and personality defects.
183. Quoted in MoNTAGU 333.
184. An excellent example of this is found in Lewis v. Read, 41 N.J. 121, 193 A.2d
255 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Here the dispute turned on whether the child's afflictions (deaf,
dumb, subject to seizures) was the result of a congenital infirmity or the negligence
of the physician attending at childbirth.
Another case is reported in the New York Times, Nov. 19, 1964, p. 31, col. 3. There
a mother and her son recovered 158,000 dollars from the Doctors Hospital in New York
City. It was alleged that the baby's birth was delayed by pressing towels against his
head until the obstetrician arrived. Medical experts testified that this could have cut
off the baby's oxygen supply and caused the irreparable brain damage. The case was
apparently a complete reversal of the usual malpractice trial, as the plaintiff called
thirteen witnesses and the defendant, a retired neurologist, one.
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bility will be narrowed since fault can be found only when a disease
has been communicated intentionally or negligently to the mother
and thus to the fetus. Again, limits must be drawn as a practical
matter, for, even assuming that it be determined with certainty
that influenza exerts a deleterious effect upon the fetus, it would be
asking too much of society to require every person who has contracted influenza to isolate himself completely from his fellows.
The transmission of teratogenic agents from mother to fetus
usually takes place transplacentally. The placenta functions more
as a filter 1811 than as a barrier. 186 Viruses and gases on occasions may
pass unmodified, but at other times some modification takes place.187
Transplacental transmission is not, however, the only form of carriage, and experiments have determined that some transmission
between mother and child can take place through the surrounding
fluids. 188 The importance of this lies in the fact that the fetus enjoys
no period of invincibility. Thus, though certain critical times are
reached before the placenta functions properly, 189 teratogenic agents
may still have had an opportunity to effect their serious insults.
Since viruses grow well on young proliferating tissue, 190 the
consequences of viral infections are likely to be far more severe
during the first trimester. The sequelae can range from death to
mild changes, congenital anomalies being somewhere in between. 191
The leading case on the negligent communication of diseases is
probably Evans v. Liverpool Corporation. 192 There the visiting physician of a convalescent nursing home negligently discharged the
plaintiff's son, who was still suffering from scarlet fever, with the
result that the plaintiff's other three children became infected.
Judgment was in fact rendered for the defendant, but on the basis
of the now discredited rule that permitted a hospital to escape
liability for negligent performance of professional duties by
185. AREY, op. cit. supra note 144, at 139; Sandberg, Drugs in Pregnancy: Their
Effects on the Fetus and Newborn, 94 CALIF. MED. 267, 287 (1961).
186. It is an insuperable barrier to bacteria, however, AREY, op. cit. supra note 144,
at 139.
187. See MoNTAGU 48; Page, Transfer of Materials Across the Human Placenta, 74
AM. J. OBSTET. 8: GYNEC. 705 (1957). See generally Earn 8: Nicholson, The Placental
Circulation, Maternal and Fetal, 63 AM. J. 0BSTET. 8: GYNEC. I (1952); Potter, Placental
Transmission of Viruses, 74 AM. J. OBSTET. 8: GYNEC. 505 (1957).
188. MONTAGU 51-56.
189. The placenta starts to function at about the fourth week, but only does so
perfectly at the beginning of the fourth month. MoNTAGU 51.
190. Because certain anti-cancer drugs act in a similar manner, these ought not to
be administered to pregnant women. MoNTAGU 355.
191. Adams, Viral Infections in the Embryo, 92 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 109 (1956); Evans
8: Brown, Congenital Anomalies and Virus Infections, 87 AM. J. OBSTET. 8: GYNEC. 749
(1963).
192. [1906] 1 K.B. 160. See also Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663
(1919).
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its staff. 193 An interesting aspect of the case was counsel's attempt
to hold the hospital absolutely liable on a Rylands v. Fletcher194
analogy. However, the court refused so to extend the principle; thus
plaintiffs in this class of case will be required to prove defendants'
negligence.
In this regard there has been some discussion of a requirement
of either a contractual relationship between the parties195 or actual
knowledge of the danger plus a failure to give warning on the part
of the defendant; 196 but it seems likely that all a plaintiff will have
to show is that the doctor exhibited a lack of skill and care in diagnosis197 or discharge. 198 As against a layman defendant, questions
of special skill are irrelevant, and his liability will be grounded
upon the ordinary principles of negligence.
With the notable exception of rubella (German measles) and
syphilis, there has been little evidence and a great deal of speculation as to the ramifications of diseases. Adams and his co-workers
found that when mice were injected with a human strain of influenza a decrease in the pregnancy rate and an increase in the fetal
abnormality rate resulted. 199 On the other hand, Hartman and
Kennedy found that maternal illness during the first trimester of
pregnancy led to no appreciable increase in the incidence of congenital abnormalities. 200
There is a body of opinion that would include various other contagious diseases, such as measles, chicken pox, and small pox,201 as
teratogenic. But, until further evidence is forthcoming, they cannot
be indicted with any great measure of confidence.
a. Rubella
The lowly rubella virus has been connected beyond a reasonable
doubt with a "flush-hand" of abnormalities, including deafness,
muteness, dental defects, cleft palate, cardiac defects, cataracts,
193. The rule was abandoned in the United Kingdom in Cassidy v. Ministry of
Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343. Some American courts are following suit and shedding this
unjustifiable immunity. E.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 662, 163 N.Y. Supp. 29 (1958).
194. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
195. E.g., Hales v. Kerr, [1908] 2 K.B. 601.
196. CLARK & LINDSELL, TORTS § 1775 (12th ed. 1961); cf. Davis v. Rodman, 147
Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 6\2 (1921).
197. Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
198. Evans v. Liverpool Corp., [1906] 1 K.B. 160.
199. Adams, supra note 191. See also Leck, Incidence of Malformations Following
Influenza Epidemics, 17 BRIT. J. PREY. & Soc. MED. 70 (1963).
200. 5.4%: 5.2%, Hartman & Kennedy, Illness in the First Trimester of Pregnancy,
38 J. PEDIATRICS 306 (1951); Warkany & Kalter, Congenital Malformations, 265 NEW
ENG, J. MED. 1046 (1961).
201. Manson, Logan & ~y, Rubella and Other T'irus Infections During Pregnancy,
H.M.S.O. 1960. See also MoNTAGU 284-307.
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mental deficiency, and microcephaly. 202 There are two theories as to
the mechanism of the virus:
(1) It may prevent normal development by invading the differentiating cells; or
(2) It may invade the embryonic vascular tissue and, by damaging the blood vessels, disturb nutrition.203
But, whatever the theory, the fact remains that it is one of the most
destructive of all environmental agents. One of its serious aspects
is to be found in the fact that the infection may be so mild that not
even the mother is aware of her condition.204 Maternal immunization may not protect the fetus, and it has recently been reported
that the virus possesses the ability to survive long enough to cause
defects even when the mother suffered from the infection a few
weeks before conception.205
Doctors have suggested that young girls be artificially infected206
or have encouraged the practice of rubella parties,207 at which the
mother of an infected daughter would allow her to spread the disease
among the female offspring of her friends. Besides the fact that
rubella may have the, albeit rare, consequence of encephalitis,208
a lawyer can only warn of the increased dangers involved in communicating the disease to outsiders, some of whom may conceivably be pregnant. A rubella party presents precisely such a risk,
and it is one by reason of which the actor's conduct may be characterized as negligent. Thus the greatest care ought to be taken to
ensure that the ramifications of what is essentially a good deed do
not include that which was sought to be avoided.
The serious nature of German measles early in pregnancy has
provided the main platform upon which is grounded the medicolegal desire to clarify the boundaries of criminal abortion.209 There
is no doubt that a number of abortions are performed each year
202. Bell, On Rubella in Pregnancy, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 686 (1959); Coffey &: Jessop,
Rubella and Incidence of Congenital Anomalies, 6 IRISH J. MED. SCI. 1 (1959); Inghalls,
Rubella, Its Epidemiology and Teratology, 239 AM. J. MED. Sci. 363 (1960); Jackson &:
Fisch, Deafness Following Rubella, 2 THE LANCET 1241 (1959).
203. Skinner, .The Rubella Problem, 101 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 104, 107 (1961).
204. Wilson, Experimental Studies in Congenital Malformations, IO J. CHRON. DIS.
Ill, 123 (1959).
205. Selzer, Virus Isolation, Inclusion Bodies, and Chromosomes in a Rubella-Infected Human Embryo, 2 THE LANCET 336, 337 (1963).
206. Skinner, supra note 203, at 106.
207, MoNTAGU 283.
208. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 200, at 999 (1961).
209. The critical time is during the first trimester. Id. at 998. See also Pleydell,
Anencephaly and Other Congenital Anomalies, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 309 (1960). He warns
of the possibility of destroying healthy pregnancies if the abortion is performed as a
result of infection during the latter half of the gestation period. After the passing of
the critical time, infection presents a negligible risk. MoNTAGU 281.
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upon women who have contracted German measles, and it does
seem unjust to expect the medical profession to practice in this
zone of apparent criminality. Rubella certainly presents the most
appealing case for therapeutic abortion, and it is probable that
today, because of our knowledge of the disease and its probable
results when contracted at critical times, such an exception, recognized in law, would not be subject to abuse.
b. Syphilis
The venereal disease syphilis is connected with the birth of congenitally syphilitic babies and the infliction of deafness and mental
retardation. 210 Most of the knowledge in this field has been culled
from individual cases.211 Dr. Bonugli has reported that "no grounds
appear to exist to support a belief that syphilis is spontaneously
losing its power to attack, damage or destroy the products of conception in the human female." 212
Syphilis is capable of producing its damage at the moment of
conception. The Civil Senate of the Supreme Court of West Germany held that a cause of action had accrued to an infant plaintiff
who sued a hospital alleging that, as a result of a negligent blood
transfusion, the donor of which was syphilitic, plaintiff was caused,
after her subsequent conception, to be born suffering from congenital syphilis.213 But whether a common-law country would recognize a right of action arising from an act that simultaneously harmed
and created the plaintiff is an open question.
Adopting a causative approach, it is relatively simple to impeach
the manufacturer of defective baby food214 or a pharmaceutical
company that manufactures contraceptive pills which result in faulty
spermagenesis,215 even though the act of omission takes place not
only before the birth but also before the conception of the child.
Holmes' original query must now be answered by saying that it is
possible to owe a prospective conditional liability to one not yet
in being.216 In Zepeda v. Zepeda217 it was held that the fathering of
an illegitimate child was a tort against the child. After going that
210. Warkany & Kalter, supra note 200, at 1046.
211. Pleydell, supra note 209, at 312.
212. Bonugli, Untreated Syphilis, 33 BRIT. J. VENER. DIS. 217, 222 (1957). Syphilis is
likely to cause the spontaneous premature onset of labor should there be a post-con•
ception infection. Eastman, Prematurity From the Viewpoint of the Obstetrician, 1
AM. PRAG. 343 (1947).
.
213. B.G.HZ., 8, 243 (II Civ. Sen. December 20, 1952).
214. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
215. Van der Meiwe, Note, 26 TYD. VIR HED. R-H REG. 294 (1963).
216. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
217. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
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far, however, the Illinois court refused relief, expressing the view
that the legislature is the proper body to extend such a remedy.
The court referred to the prenatal injury cases as follows:
"The case at bar seems to be the natural result of the present
course of the law permitting actions for physical injury ever
closer to the moment of conception. In point of time it goes
just a little further. The significance of this course to us is
this: if recovery is to be permitted an infant injured one month
after conception, why not if injured one week after, one minute
after or at the moment of conception? It is inevitable that the
date will be further retrogressed. How can the law distinguish
the day to day development of life? If there is human life,
proved by the subsequent birth, then that human life has the
same rights at the time of conception as it has at any time
thereafter. There cannot be absolutes in the minute to minute
progress of life from sperm and ovum to cell, to embryo to
fetus, to child."21s
It therefore seems that a congenitally syphilitic child could have
a right of action arising from the same act by which it is conceived.219 However, in this class of cases the child will have to controvert parental immunity where it still exists.220 It is submitted that
maternal consent to the act of intercourse ought not to be extended to deny relief to the child.221
Closely related to this case would be the question of the right
of action in the defective offspring of an incestuous union, and
again it is submitted that the child ought to be able to recover.
The fact that the child will have to sue through a guardian may
not present too great a problem, since in certain circumstances, as
in the syphilis cases, maternal annoyance may suffice.222 But, in the
incestuous union situation, a harder practical problem is presented.
3. Irradiation

The highest percentage of "law suit casualties" in the medical
profession falls on those specialists practicing in the field of roentgenology and radiology. 223 Radiologists have been held responsible for
218. Id. at 249-50. (Emphasis added.)
219. Cf. Note, 77 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1349 (1964).
220. See PROSSER, ToRl'S § IOI, at 675-77 (2d ed. 1955). Compare Deziel v.
Deziel, [1953] I D.L.R. 651, and Young v. Rankin, [1934] S.C. 499.
221. Hegarty v. Shine, 4 D.L.R. 288 (Irish 1878). If there has been fraud,
however, the woman may recover. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E.
206 (1920).
222. FOOTE &: SANDER, CAsES ON FAMILY LAw 5B-21a (temp. ed. 1962), reports a case
of "paternal annoyance." In that case a husband recovered damages against an abortionist who had performed an illegal abortion upon the wife with her consent.
223, STETLER &: MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATII:NT AND THE LAW 421 (4th ed. 1962).
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causing death,224 injuries through burns,225 and even prompting
"cancerphobia.''226 At least in South Africa, with reference to radiologists the implied consent usually found when a patient submits
to medical treatment will be insufficient unless the doctors fully
explain the potential dangers and risks involved in therapeutic
treatment. 227
There is no doubt that irradiation, be it atomic228 or therapeutic,229 has a detrimental effect on the fetus. Depending upon the
dosage, the result may be intrauterine death, 280 maldevelopment or
malformation,231 the rendering of the conceptus sterile,232 or the
causing of mutational changes that may be transmissible to the
descendants of the irradiated fetus. 233 The possibility that negligent
irradiation may affect the germ cells and thus produce hereditary
congenital malformations opens up a field of almost perpetual liability.234 Perhaps the courts, when faced with this problem, may
limit the liability by compensating the original plaintiff for his
224. Hess v. Rouse, 22 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
225. Merkle v. Kegerreis, 350 Ill. App. 103, 112 N.E.2d 175 (1953); Simon v.
Kaplan, 321 Ill. App. 203, 52 N.E.2d 832 (1944); McElroy v. Frost, 268 P.2d 273
(Okla. 1954); McCaffrey v. Hague, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 291.
226. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958).
227. Esterhuizen v. Administrator, Transvaal, [1957] So. Afr. L.R. 710; Lymbery v. Jeffries, 1925 A.D. 236. See Milner, The Doctor's Dilemma, 74 S.A.L.J.
384 (1957).
228. See authorities cited in note 141 supra. Professor Cavers in his recent article,
Improving Financial Protection of the Public Against the Hazards of Nuclear Power,
77 HARV. L. REv. 644 (1964), discusses the question of cancer causation only, at p. 669.
But his arguments as to strict liability are equally relevant in the case of fetal irradiation damage or the case where irradiation may lead to hereditary defects. Cf. Lloyd,
Liability for Radiation Injuries, 12 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 33 (1959). Lloyd finds the
damage (i.e., a radiation injury transmissible to offspring) too uncertain and intangible
for legal remedy at present. Id. at 52.
229. There is, however, some dispute as to the ramifications of diagnostic
dosages. See generally Dunlap, Medicolegal Aspects of Injuries From Exposure
to Roentgen Rays and Radioactive Substances, 11 Mo. L. REv. 137, 181, 186-88
(1946); Roland &: Weinberg, Radiation Effect on the Unborn Embryo Immedi•
ately After Conception, 62 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1167 (1951); Stone, Radiation Hazards in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 15 N.Y. MED. 605 (1959).
230. Mayer, Therapeutic Abortion by. Means of an X-Ray, 32 AM. J. OBS'I'ET.
&: GYNEC. 945 (1936).
231. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 200, at 1048.
232. A "possibility." MoNTAGU 460. But see Gruenwald, Mechanisms of Ab·
normal Development, 44 ARcH. PATH. 398, 405 (1947). X-rays are used for sterilization
purposes. Dunlap, supra note 229, at 181-84. A recent article reports a case in which
the mother's ovaries were exposed to a therapeutic dosage after which she con•
ceived a child that has been born. To date no abnormalities have been de•
tected. Welton &: McSweeney, Successful Pregnancy After Radiation Therapy
for Carcinoma of the Cervix, 88 AM. J. OBSTET. &: ,GYNEC. 443 (1964).
233. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 185 (6th ed. 1954); Boyd, Damage to
Chromosomes by Therapeutic Doses of Radioiodine, 1961-1 THE LANCET 997.
234. Statutes of limitations or prescription do not as a rule run against
minors. See WINFIELD, TORTS § 804 (7th ed. 1963); Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 553,
574 (1962).
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inability to procreate normal children, leaving the election whether
to have children to the plaintiff_ without allowing him again to involve the negligent defendant in a later suit.
It has been suggested that fifteen or twenty roentgens at the
fetal site will be sufficient to cause damage. 235 The serious nature of
this submission may be appreciated by reference to the Nolan and
Patterson report, 236 wherein it is stated that one dental X-ray machine in San Francisco produced 315 r at a single sitting. The
posture of patients in a dental chair unquestionably exposes the
pelvic area to the downward X-rays.237
There is some dispute as to whether the incidence of leukemia
increases after fetal irradiation, even in diagnostic dosages. 238 Some
further studies are necessary, but it seems clear that the pregnant
uterus ought never to be exposed to X-rays, no matter how small
the dosage. 289 This will raise problems when the mother requires
therapeutic treatment in the fetal area, and in these circumstances
it might be desirable to terminate the pregnancy.240
Two American decisions have dealt with the question of prenatal
injuries caused by irradiation. In both, relief was denied as a matter
of law. In Smith v. Luckhardt,241 a physician negligently diagnosed
a pregnancy as a tumor of the womb and administered six, onehalf hour X-ray treatments over a period of three months. The
child, who was born feeble-minded and crippled, lived to the age
of thirteen years, but died subsequent to the commencement of the
2!15. NESnnT 249. There is a dispute as to the dosages required in order to
bring about each type of harm. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 200, at 1048.
236. Nolan &: Patterson, Radiation Hazards From the Use of X-Ray Units,
61 RADIOLOGY 625 (195!1). A dentist was held liable for X-ray bums in Ragin v.
Zimmerman, 206 Cal. 72!1, 276 Pac. 107 (1929).
2!17. MONTAGU 458.
2!18. Cooper &: Steinbeck, Leukemia Following Irradiation in Utero, 3ll BRIT.
J. RAnroL. 265 (1959); cf. Court, Brown &: Doll, Prospective Study of Leukemia
Mortality of Children Exposed to Anti-natal Diagnostic Radiography, 53 PROC.
RoY. Soc'Y MED., 761 (1960); Ford, Fetal Exposure to Diagnostic X-Rays and
Leukemia and Other Malignant Diseases in Childhood, 22 J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
1093 (1959).
2!19. MoNTAGU 446-71. An exception may be radioiodine treatment, however,
for the fetal thyroid functions only after about twelve weeks. Thus the administration of radioactive iodine is dangerous only after the elapse of this
period, See Chapman, The Collection of Radioactive Iodine by the Human Fetal
Thyroid, 8 J. CLIN. ENDOCRIN. 717 (1948).
In discussing causation problems, Gamble, in a note in 3 VAND. L. REv. 282
(1950), suggests the use of X-rays in order to determine damage while the child
is still in utero. Something of this nature was done in Sox (see text at note 268 infra),
but it does seem wise not to use X-ray at all.
240. Nice problems of balancing maternal-fetal interests arise here. See 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 55!1, 581 (1962). As long as the tragedy in this class of case lies in
survival rather than death (MoNTAGU 453), it seems that the balance is heavily
weighted in favor of the mother.
241. 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939).
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suit. In Stemmer v. Kline, 242 however, the child, a microcephalic
idiot, was still alive at the time suit was brought against a physician
who, without the use of any one of several tests available and
solely after a manual examination, also treated a pregnancy as a
tumor. There has been much justifiable criticism by doctors of the
relief granted in some of the trauma cases,243 but these two decisions
represent the zenith of injustice reached under the old rule. It is
quite clear that in future cases of this type plaintiffs will experience
little difficulty in succeeding.

4. Drugs
As long as there is a justifiable fear of a relationship between
mental deficiency and perinatal anoxia, anesthetics, analgesics, and
sedatives are contraindicated.244 There are certain other drugs, however, that may affect the fetus by interfering directly with embryogenesis.
a. The Synthetic Progestins
Synthetic hormone substances, primarily progesterone, have been
administered to women who threaten to abort, and there have been
reports of resulting abnormal sexual development in the offspring.
It is believed that the abnormalities may occur if the substances
are administered at the critical time when the gonads begin to develop sexually.245
b. Abortificients

In 1952, Dr. Thiersch found that 4-aminopteroylglutamic acid
was a successful therapeutic abortificient.246 Dr. Meltzer reported a case in which he felt it advisable to allow a woman who
had taken a large quantity of the acid to go to term, as Dr. Thiersch's
contribution was alone in the field. 247 The child born to this
242. 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942). And see Pilgrim v. Landham, 11
S.E.2d (Ga. App. 1940).
243. See text accompanying note 274 infra. Criticisms founded on present-day
medical knowledge of some of the decisions are a little hazardous, however,
since most matters are heard on demurrer before any evidence has been introduced. The factual allegations set out in the opinions are, to say the least,
skimpy.
244. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
245. The gonads are the generalized sex glands which under hormone ex•
posure begin to develop sexually during the fifth to eighth week of pregnancy.
See MONTAGU 349-50.
246. Thiersch, Therapeutic Abortions With a Folic Acid Antagonist, 4-Aminopteroylglutamic Acid Administered by the Oral Route, 63 AM. J. OnSTEr. &:
GYNEC. 1298 (1952).
247. Meltzer, Congenital Anomalies due to Attempted Abortion With .f-Amino•
pteroylglutamic Acid, 161 A.M.A.J. 1253 (1956).
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woman exhibited a number of anomalies. -Dr. Warkany reported a
similar case.248 The acid is a volatile folic acid antagonist, the
latter compound being essential to healthy uterine growth.
The likelihood of a child being able to bring an action against
its mother who has failed in an abortion attempt is, from the practical point of view, slight. The courts would no doubt entertain
such an action, but the problems of proof would be almost insurmountable. It seems, therefore, that prospective children will be
protected only by the existence of a criminal sanction. The civil
law is able to achieve little in this purely preventive field.
c. Thalidomide

The drug thalidomide (alpha N-Phthalimide glutarimide)
achieved immense po:pularity because it did not produce the usual
side effects of sedatives. It was sold literally by the ton in
Western Europe, England, Canada, Brazil, and Japan.
Animal experiments, mainly on horses which are susceptible to
human sleep-inducing drugs, led to no untoward events. Two attempts at suicide by means of the drug failed. Glowing reports in
the medical press resulted.249
The first warning as to possible ill-effects was a suggestion that
this drug might be a cause of periphereal neuritis,250 but it was not
until November 8, 1961, that Dr. Lenz in West Germany, concerned
at the reports of the increasing number of children suffering from
phocomelia, suspected the drug as being responsible. On November
15th he warned Grunenthal Chemie, the West German manufacturer, of his suspicions. And, on November 20th, at a meeting of
Dusseldorf Pediatricians, without naming the drug publicly he expressed his suspicions. Grunenthal withdrew the drug from the
West German market on November 26th, and radio, TV, and every
newspaper in West Germany (on their front pages) publicized this
action, warning pregnant women not to take the tablets.251
Meanwhile, Dr. Hayman of the British Manufacturing Company wrote to The Lancet, reporting that the drug had been withdrawn from the British Market. 252 On December 16th an Australian
doctor, in a letter to the same journal, suggested the link and re248. Warkany, Attempted Abortion With Aminopterin, 97. AM. J. DIS. CHILD.
274 (1959).
249. See Mellin &: Katzenstein, The Saga of Thalidomide (pts. 1-2), 267
A.M.A.J. ll84, ll87-90, 1238 (1962).
250. Florence, Is Thalidomide to Blame1, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1954 (1960).
251. Taussig, A Study of the German Outbreak of Phocomelia: The Thalidomide Syndrome, 267 A.M.A.J. ll06, 1109 (1962).
252. 1961-1 THE LANCET 1262.
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quested his British colleagues to forward any information that they
might have 253 on the effects of the drug upon children in utero. A
flood of correspondence followed, and reports coming from around
the world confirmed the worst suspicions.25 ~
The application to sell the drug in the United States was filed
by the American licensee on September 12, 1960, but, as a result of
what a Senate committee termed the "insight and courage"255 of
Dr. Frances Kelsey and despite the tremendous pressure brought by
the drug company involved,256 thalidomide was never approved for
sale in the United States. Quantities of the drug, however, were
dispersed to doctors, and at least nine children suffering from phocomelia were born in the United States after their mothers had taken
thalidomide during the first trimester.257
The thalidomide tragedy raised interesting questions of law. On
July 20th the Lord Chancellor, Lord Dilhome, stated that the possibility that the drug caused the ptoduction of defective children
was not sufficient to establish a "lawful" ground for an abortion.
In so doing he crossed swords with the irrepressible Lady Summerskill.21Ss
On July 25th suit was brought in the Supreme Court of Arizona,
plaintiff alleging that she was three months pregnant, had taken
thalidomide, and desired to undergo an abortion. An immunity
from prosecution was requested.259 The defendants in their reply
brief stated that, if the facts were as presented, namely that the
health of the mother was endangered, then Arizona law would be
no bar to an abortion. Consequently, the judge ruled that there
was no legal controversy and dismissed the application.260
In Liege, Belgium, a young mother, her husband, and her
family doctor were charged with homicide.261 The state alleged that
they had killed a seven-day-old phocomelic baby by feeding it
barbiturate-poisoned milk. At the subsequent trial, which took
place in dramatic circumstances, the accused were acquitted.262
253. McBride, in 1961-2 THE LANCET 1358.
254. E.g., Letters by Lenz, Pfeiffer&: Kosenow, and Speiers in 1962·1 THE LANCET
45, 303.
255. S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 43 (1962).
256. Including the suggestion of the possibility of a libel action against Dr. Kclscy.
Id. at 42.
257. N.Y. Times (Western ed.) Dec. 13, 1962, p. 7, col. 5.
258. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1962, p. 12, col. 1.
259. Id., July 26, 1962, p. 25, col. 1.
260. Id., July 31, 1962, p. 9, cols. 1-2.
261. Id., Aug. 8, 1962, p. 19, cols. 1-2.
262. Id., Nov. 11, 1962, p. 1, col. 7. The court was cleared when spectators shouted
to the jury to acquit the accused (id., Nov. 8, 1962, p. 47, col. 8). On November 10th,
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At least three civil suits have been filed against the pharmaceutical companies,268 but to date none have come to trial. In West
Germany, institution of criminal proceedings against the manufacturer is still under consideration.
There are two heartening aspects of the tragedy. The first is the
responsibility that doctors have accepted in devising, reporting, and
advising on schemes to take care of thalidomide babies.264 The
second is the political impetus it gave to reforming drug administration laws in a number of countries.

5. Trauma
The use of physical force against the mother may affect the fetus
in a number of ways. There may follow a miscarriage (abortion,
prematurity) or stillbirth. Again, the placenta may become detached, uterine bleeding may ensue, and maternal shock or emotional disturbance can exert a deleterious effect upon the fetus.
Much medical doubt pervades the question whether maternal
trauma is a factor relevant to fetal health; it is solely responsible
for abortions or miscarriages in only a small minority of cases,265
and it is difficult to see how it can result in congenital malformations since its mechanism will operate in a subtractive manner
rather than destroying physically the fetal structure, whether at the
foundational or proliferational stage.266 That being so, its relationship
with mental deficiencies becomes relevant, since placental damage
and shock may affect the oxygen supply. Anoxia as a cause of these
disorders has been underlined with a great query, and so claims of
this nature ought to be regarded with a fair measure of skepticism.
The overwhelming majority of cases reported in this article have
arisen out of maternal traumatic experience, and it is clear that this
will continue to provide the most fruitful source of litigation.267
when the verdict was due to be returned, feeling had run so high in favor of acquittal
that police had to guard the court house.
263. (i) By an association of the victims of the drug against Grunenthal and filed
in Frankfurt. The Observer, July 15, 1962. (ii) Diamond v. Merrell Co., for 2.5
million dollars. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1962, p. 24, col. 1. (iii) Harvey v. Grunenthal Chem.
Co. for 2.2 million dollars, in respect of twin children who were born suffering
from phocomelia. Id., Oct. 19, 1962, p. 33, col. 1.
264. E.g., Trueta, Care of Thalidomide Babies, 1962·2 THE 'LANCET 1162.
265. The child is protected by the physics of its fetal existence in that the surround•
ing fluids, as a matter of hydraulics, provide a cushioning effect to any external blow.
PATIEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 230 (2d ed. 1953); and see McNeil, Acddental Injuries
to Women, 83 CALIF. MED. 30 (1955).
266. Gross mechanical injury rarely leads to malformation. See Gruenwald, Mecha•
nisms of Abnormal Development, 44 .AR.CHIV. PATH, 398, 415 (1947).
267. Allegations that trauma was responsible for physical abnormalities were not
proved after trial on the facts in the following cases: Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe
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But the fetus itself may suffer a direct injury. This will usually
occur when the maternal abdominal wall has been perforated or
punctured. Although in most cases such an injury will cause the
immediate onset of labor or will at least provide sufficient reason
for a therapeutic abortion, it is also conceivable that this kind of
wound might lead to fetal infection.
So far as may be culled from the_ rather scanty factual reports in
the published decisions, there have been few cases involving a direct
blow to the fetus, although in Sox v. United States268 the infant
plaintiff suffered head injuries as a result of a collision in which
its mother received five fractures in the pelvic region close to the
child's head.
The most fruitful potential source of actions with respect to
direct fetal injury will be force applied during delivery. In this
class of cases the infant has always succeeded.269
a. Physical Trauma

Death. As long as wrongful death actions are allowed in the
prenatal injury field, traumatic abortion and stillbirth cases are
going to be brought before the courts. The susceptibilities of some
women to abort are legend, and many cases have allowed the mother
Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Valence v. Louisiana Light &: Power Co.,
50 So. 2d 847 (La. 1951); Puhl v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959). And
in Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947), the plaintiff lost because he
introduced no expert testimony. The plaintiff succeeded after trial in Sox v. United
States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960), and Seattle First Nat'! Bank v. Rankin, 59
Wash. 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
The outstanding example of unjustified "causative" success was in the Canadian
case of Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933), in which the trauma was
held to be the cause of club feet. It is hazardous to draw conclusions from the scanty
facts provided in the opinions, but, if the plaintiffs finally succeeded in Von Elbe v.
Studebaker-Packard, 15 Pa. D. &: C. 2d 629 (1958) (three months after accident born
with an "expanded" heart, collapsed lung, and clubbing of the right foot) and Smith
v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (born seventy-five days after accident with
deformities of legs and feet), they could also join Canadian Company.
Allegations that trauma was responsible for mental injury were averred in the following cases in which the plaintiff succeeded in removing the legal bar: Daley v. Meier,
33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961) (subnormal mental faculties-mother one
month pregnant at the time of the accident); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291
P.2d 225 (1955) (cerebral palsy-mother three months pregnant at the time of the
accident). See also Jasinky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
268. 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960). A similar case is the matter of Shousha v.
Matthews Drivurself Serv., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962), wherein it was alleged
that triplets were born "bruised, mashed and crushed." In addition, in Jasinky v. Potts,
supra note 267, it was also alleged that the infant received a direct blow.
269. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946): "taken from its mother's
womb through professional malpractice with resultant consequences of a detrimental
character." See also Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 77 So. 2d 434 (1954); see text accompanying note 78 supra; Seattle First Nat'! Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 288, 367 P.2d 835
(1962) (negligent attempt to deliver with forceps).
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to recover for her own injuries ~owing from a miscarriage. 270 On
the other hand, other women have and may demonstrate an exceptional hardiness271 in the face of physical insults.
Dr. Hertig, in a pioneer study, thoroughly examined one thousand abortuses and concluded that only one could be fairly attributed
to external trauma.272 In addition, he discussed the incidence of
traumatic abortion witli members of the Boston Obstetric Society,
and the total opinion produced six accounts of bona fide traumatic
abortion.278 Dr. Hertig summed up the proof problem in the following manner:
"The thesis of this report therefore may be summed up by
stating that, in the opinion of the author, the plaintiff in a case
of alleged traumatic abortion must present proof of the presence
of a normal pregnancy at the time of the trauma and that the
abortus shows objective clinical, embryological and pathologic
evidence of the relationship to the trauma."274
The requirement of normality of the ovum may not be accepted
as an exculpatory factor in a court of law. In any event it is difficult
to see how fetal normality can be of any relevance where fetal death
is occasioned by maternal death. Nevertheless, it deserves to be
underlined that trauma as an isolated cause in the field of prenatal
injuries plays a relatively minor and insignificant role. It must be
accepted that the abolition of the legal barrier is not going to change_
the end result in a number of cases, and the irony of the matter is
that, although courts of law have appealed time and time again to
the advances in medical knowledge while assailing Holmes' view,
the advance, if any, in the trauma field has served only to emphasize
the irrelevance of trauma as a teratogenic agent.
Prematurity. 27r; It may well be that prematurity is in itself an
270. See note 95 supra. For a critical appraisal of the granting of relief in these circumstances, see Note, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 188 (1947).
271. See the exceptional case reported by OGSTON, LECTURES ON MEDICAL JurusPRUDENCE 200-01 (1878), in which an abortion attempt included the ingestion of drugs,
kneeling and jumping on the stomach of a seven months pregnant woman, and, finally,
perforation of the uterus with a pair of scissors. All of which failed to dislodge or
apparently affect the fetus at all.
272. Hertig, Minimal Criteria Required To Prove Prima Facie Case of ,T;raumatic
Abortion or Miscarriage, 117 ANN. SURGERY 596 (1943).
273. They were (i) extreme exertion during a thunderstorm (l); (ii) auto accidents
(3); (iii) climbing the mast of a sailboat during a sail race to fix a broken halyard (l);
(iv) severe coughing (1). Id. at 605.
274. Id. at 598. An additional temporal factor was added: "When trauma is an
etiologic factor in an abortion it must immediately precede by a matter of hours, the
onset of the sequence of events that results in an expulsion of a normal ovum."
Id. at 604.
275. Dr. Eastman found 73.8% of all premature births to be spontaneous. Eastman,
Prematurity From the Viewpoint of the Obstetrician, 1 A:M. PRAc. 343 (1947). In his
study, Anderson found no case of prematurity that could be directly and unreservedly
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injury, and where the child survives premature labor and birth,276
absent other injuries, "premature birth actions" may be brought.277
The premature infant is one that weighs twenty-five hundred grams
(five pounds, eight ounces,) or less at birth278 and is understandably
an unfinished child. Thus its ability to cope with the external world
is decreased.
Some investigators have submitted that a relationship exists between prematurity and physical growth, physical defects, 279 cerebral
palsy,280 other mental handicaps, and proneness to ill health. 281 The
investigations as to these sequelae are still in the preliminary stages.
Should a causal connection ever be satisfactorily established, an
entirely new field of liability may be opened. It seems difficult to
consider, however, that it will ever be possible for a child to argue
that its present mental capacity is attributable to its premature birth
and that absent prematurity, it would have achieved a greater academic success in life. One ought to be careful of embracing beliefs
that can only be described as unwavering uterine predestination. On
the other hand, the susceptibility of the prematurely born infant to
infection or other disorders is more certain, and a wrongdoer's liability would probably be extended today to include the additional
damage. 282
attributed to trauma. Anderson, Causes of Prematurity, 61 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 72, 83
(1941).
276. The very immaturity of the child may reduce its ability to survive. But, in
all jurisdictions, as long as it is born alive its cause of action may survive to its intestate
estate. See note 87 supra.
277. The premature child may in addition suffer from congenital malformations.
Often the abnormality is itself the cause of prematurity.
278. MONTAGU 398.
279. Dann, The Development of Prematurely Born Children With Birth Weights or
Minimal Post-Natal Weights of 1,000 gms. or Less, 22 PEDIATRICS 1037 (1958); Drillien,
Physical and Mental Handicap in the Prematurely Born, 66 J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. (BRIT.
EMP.) 721 (1959).
280. Knobloch, The Effect of Prematurity on Health and Growth, 49 AM. J. Pun.
HEALTH 1164 (1959); Knobloch, Neuropsychiatric Sequelae of Prematurity, 161 A.M.A.J.
581 (1956).
281. See James, The Later Health of Premature Infants, 22 PEDIATRICS 154 (1958);
Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors With the Development of Mental Defidency: I. Abnormalities in the Prenatal and Paranatal Periods,
159 A.M.A.J. 155 (1955); Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, The Assodation of Maternal and
Fetal Factors With the Development of Mental Deficiency: II. Relationship to Maternal
Age, Birth Order, Previous Reproductive Loss and Degree of Mental Deficiency, 60
AM. J. MENT. DEFIC. 557 (1956).
282. Rl:sTATEMENT, TORTS § 458 (1934); PROSSER, TORTS § 49, at 273 (2d ed. 1955). In
Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947), the plaintiff's premature child died
after suffering from both measles and pneumonia following a cold. On cross-examination, the plaintiff husband conceded that he could not blame the defendant for the
child's attack of measles, but opined that the defendant's fault could have led to the
cold and the pneumonia, there being some evidence that the premature birth had
weakened the child's resistance. No medical evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs,
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In Mays v. Weingarten, 283 it was alleged that the prematurely
born infant, as a result thereof, contracted bronchial pneumonia at
the age of five weeks and that, as a further result of its weakened constitution, it would be congenitally susceptible to pain, suffering,
and much inconvenience! In two other cases it was alleged that
prematurity was related to blindness,284 and there have been a
number of cases where the prematurity resulted in early death.285
b. Psychic Trauma
It will be recalled that Dr. Hertig found only seven cases of
bona fide traumatic abortion resulting from physical trauma. With
reference to psychic trauma, Dr. Eastman reports that: "In the
case of psychic trauma proof is immensely more difficult to obtain.
In questioning many men with vast obstetrical experience most say
that they have never seen such a thing." 286
Maternal shock, unaccompanied by physical impact, may interfere with respiratory processes. Fetal oxygen deficiency may be
the result. Once more the sequelae of anoxia become relevant. But
lesser emotional injury may also have an important influence. The
history of the development of the law relating to emotional injury
and the law of prenatal injuries are closely related; both present a
potentiality for fraudulent claims,287 and both have raised nice
questions of causation. Miscarriage, as a physical injury to the mother,
has come to typify that class of nervous shock case in which the
shock has been followed by the injury.288 Originally, courts
considered the problems arising in the shock cases on the basis of
however, and in the absence thereof the court was not prepared to indulge in the
"sheerest speculation." Id. at 270.
283. 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). The plaintiff failed, however, as a matter
of law. Cf. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. ll4, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949), wherein it was alleged that as a result of its mother's fall the prematurely born
infant plaintiff had been turned in the womb, suffered from heart trouble, anemia,
spasms, epilepsy, was crippled, and could not walk or talk like a normal person. It
should be noted, however, that abnormal fetal positions should not be attributed to
external trauma. See McNeil, supra note 265, at 31.
284. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Cavanaugh v. First
Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952).
285. E.g., Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633; 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960);
Bliss v. Passancsi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257,
ll!J S.E.2d 790 (1960).
286. EAITMAN, WILLIAMS' OBSTETRICS 532 (12th ed. 1961).
287. FLEMING, TORTS 169 (1959); Bohlen, Fifty Years of .Torts_, 50 HARV. L. R.Ev.
725, 733 (1937).
288. PROS.mt, TORTS§ 37, at 178 (2d ed. 1955). See, e.g., Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark.
587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920), wherein the defendant with knowledge of the plaintiff's pregnancy threatened to kill her husband, resulting in mental and physical pain and leading to a miscarriage. Durivagc v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947). Where no
injury follows there can be no liability against a merely negligent defendant. HAlu>EJt.
Be JAMES, TORTS § 18.9 (1956).
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remoteness of damage, but today the analysis has moved to a consideration of the duty owed. Even this has not been helpful,289 and
there have been further shifts from foreseeability of physical harm290
to foreseeability of injury by -shock. 291 Furthermore, some jurisdictions still apply the corpori corpore or impact test, sometimes reduced to ·the most ridiculous levels.292 An increasing majority of
courts, however, have abandoned the requirement. 293 Present medical
knowledge is in much the same confused state. Much of the literature has been based on anecdote. 294 Dr. Warkany has been particularly incisive and relates an example of medical conjecture in this
respect: it has been determined experimentally that cortisone induces cleft palate in certain strains of mice; 295 in criticizing the
search for new foundations for old fables, he writes that since maternal emotions "release adrenal hormones and since cortisone can
induce cleft palate in certain strains of mice . . . new mechanisms
[are] found for those who want to believe in ancient theory." 296
Dr. Stott is the leading advocate of a relationship between psychological stress and abnormalities. He relates psychic disturbance
to the incidence of Mongolism.297 Moreover, he opines that the
biological persistence of reproductive casualty is a fertility-regulator
in modern society and, therefore, explains everything in terms of
natural population control, a view that received some applause
from Montagu. 298
·
In this class of cases, legal technicality abounds, and confusion
will only be increased should the prenatal injury cases ever be ex289. "Duty, it is agreed, depends upon foreseeability, but foreseeability, a vague
concept at the best of times, is of quite exceptional vagueness when nervous shock is
in issue." WINFIELD, TORTS 256 (7th ed. 1963). See generally Goodhardt, The Shock
Cases and Area of Risk, 16 MODERN L. REv. 14 (1953).
290. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Dulieu v. White,
[1901) K.B. 669.
291. King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, approved by -the Privy Council as a correct
statement of the law in Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering
Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound), [1961) All E.R. 404, 415; HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.4,
at 1036 (1956).
292. HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.4, at 1034 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 37, at 139 (2d
ed. 1955).
293. See; e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn, 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Bourhill
v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92, 103.
294. See Hamilton, Boyd & Mossman, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 147 (3d ed. 1962).
295. Fraser & Fainstat, Production of Congenital Defects in the Offspring of Pregnant Mice Treated With Cortisone, 8 PEDIATRICS 527 (1951); Inghalls & Curley, Tiu: Relation of Hydrocortisone Injections to Cleft Palate in Mice, 256 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1035
(1957).
_
296. Warkany, Congenital Malformations in the Past, 10 J. CHRON. DJS. 84, 90 (1959);
cf. Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRoN. Dis. 97,
107 (1959).
297. Stott, Some Psychomatic Aspects_ of Casualty in Reproduction, 3 J. PsvcHo.
REs. 42 (1958).
.
298. MONTAGU 503-07.
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tended to include harm suffered by the child as a result of the
mother's emotional disturbances. Suffice it to say that for the foreseeable future that danger is remote.
V.

WHAT

Is

NEEDED

The battle in jurisprudence is almost over. The development
of the infant's right of action has illustrated the inherent capacity
of legal systems to adjust to new situations. No lawyer can believe,
however, that money does in fact remove the seal of the defendant's
fault and that anything the law may do can alleviate the misery of
the crippled. If the unborn plaintiff is no longer absent from the
courts by whim of law, it ought to be remembered that the medicolegal struggle for recognition of its right of action has been basically
motivated by something broader than what may be regarded as an
inevitable, just legal development.
Law cannot provide the solution. We may retrospectively compensate the tortiously damaged infant or prospectively require
pharmaceutical concerns to take precautions against another thalidomide tragedy. Eugenic legislation plays a small part. The true solution is not to be found in the words of society, but in a stepped-up
program of preventive medical research:
"Mr. President, for 4 long years I have been urging the strengthening of what has come to be known as perinatal research .
. . . On December I, 1958, I discussed this with Premier Nikita
Krushchev in Moscow. At that time, I urged a U.S.-U.S.S.R.
partnership in finding the answer to the mysteries of how life
develops and how so often and so tragically it emerges with
defects.
"In the years which have followed, I have been a strong
supporter of the perinatal collaborative research project . . . .
"This project is the greatest effort of its kind ever made in
medical history.
"I want every U.S. agency and doctor to gain the greatest
insight which may become available through this project."299
That is the only answer.
299. 108
1962-1 THE

CONG.

REc. 15688 (1962) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). And see Editorial,
303.
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APPENDIX

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS KNOWN To CONTRIBUTE TO CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS
AND FEI'AL DAMAGE

General Biological Factors
Parental age
Order of pregnancy
Season of birth
Geographical location
Social class
Psychological factors
Blood incompatibilities (Rhesus factor)

Regional Factors (Genital Tract and Fetal Membranes)
Faulty implantation
Ectopic pregnancies
Twinning (Siamese twins, acardiac monsters)
Amniotic bands
Abnormal uterine position of fetus?

Maternal Dietary Deficiencies
Starvation (fetal rickets and ? other effects)
Trace deficiencies (e.g., iodine in congenital cretinism)

Maternal Infections
Rubella; influenza?; poliomyelitis?; measles?
Toxoplasmosis
Syphilis
Hormones
Androgens; synthetic progestins; stilboestrol
Maternal diabetes and pre-diabetes?

Chemical Agents
(a) General
Hypoxia
Hyperoxia (retrolental fibroplasia)

(b) Drugs, Growth Inhibitors and Specific Antagonists
Antimitotics (e.g., nitrogen mustard used therapeutically)
Antimetabolites (e.g., aminopterin-used as an abortificient)

(c) Teratogenic Dyes
Physical Agents
X-rays (diagnostic and therapeutic)
Isotopes
Atomic radiation
(From HAMILTON, BOYD 8e MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 146 (3d ed. 1962))

